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Abstract
Treatment of musical borrowing under current copyright standards is far too often
inequitable. This is evident in the works of George Gershwin, who for a number of
reasons was able to borrow freely from existing traditions, works and artists,
copyright the works he produced that reflected such borrowings and then restrict
future borrowings and reinterpretations of his works. Looking at the operation and
uses of copyright in the specific instance of George Gershwin’s musical practice
reflects uses of copyright in the musical arena and demonstrates some ways in
which current copyright rules may not adequately contemplate actual practices of
music copyright holders. George Gershwin borrowed from a wide range of musical
sources, worked extensively with technical collaborators throughout his career and
immersed himself in African American musical traditions. Following Gershwin’s
death, however, the Gershwin family came to control his copyrights, highlighting
the role that heirs now play in the actual use of copyright given the fact that
copyright duration now extends to 70 years beyond the lives of individual creators.
The Gershwin heirs have in most cases not permitted borrowing or significant
reinterpretation of George Gershwin’s works. The ability of heirs to control
borrowing from and interpretations of existing musical works reflects the fact that
copyright structures to this point have been based on combining of rights of control
and compensation within copyright frameworks. Through various mechanisms,
heirs in particular tend to exert control over uses of copyright in ways that have
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little to do with the creation of musical works that is a major rationale for
copyright. By potentially significantly limiting borrowing and reinterpretation, the
exercise of control over copyright in such instances may actually hinder the
creation of later works. Uses of copyright by creators such as Gershwin and his
heirs suggest that it would be prudent in some instances to separate the control and
compensation aspects of copyright, particularly in cases of post-mortem artistic
legacies. This separation would also involve moving in the direction of a liability
rule based standard in copyright that permits borrowing other than in instances of
unfair use, in contrast to current standards that significantly limit borrowing except
in limited instances such as fair use.
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INTRODUCTION
Treatment of musical borrowings under current copyright standards is far
too often inequitable. This is evident in the works of George Gershwin,
who for a number of reasons was able to borrow freely from existing
traditions, works and artists, copyright the works he produced that
reflected such borrowings and then restrict future borrowings and
reinterpretations of his works. The Gershwin case thus illustrates that
current copyright law consideration and treatment of musical borrowing
are generally inadequate.1 If copyright is actually intended to give all
potential creators the incentive or ability to create, the use of existing
works in future creations needs to be explicitly addressed and considered
by copyright frameworks, both with respect to the sources of new works
as well as subsequent uses of such works to create future works. In the
case of George Gershwin, who borrowed extensively from African
American traditions and artists, the ability to borrow from African
American sources was intimately connected to societal hierarchies. These
hierarchies were reflected in and reinforced by copyright frameworks that
historically have permitted borrowings from certain categories and types
of cultural expression, at times without compensation.2
1

See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical

Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006)
(hereinafter, “Arewa, Hip Hop”) (discussing the pervasiveness and importance
of musical borrowing).
2

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, “Piracy,” Borrowing and Global Intellectual

Property Frameworks: History, Hierarchy and Conceptions of Culture (2005)
(manuscript on file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Piracy”); Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local
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This Article examines the uses of copyright in a particular instance,
focusing specifically on uses connected with copyrights now controlled by
the Gershwin family, who were a major proponent of the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the “CTEA”).3 More specifically,
this Article concentrates on the creation and uses of copyright with respect
to George Gershwin’s body of works,4 particularly the opera Porgy and
Knowledge and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQUETTE
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); SHIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 117-148 (2001) (discussing copyright and
African American music); Perry A. Hall, African-American Music: Dynamics of
Appropriation and Innovation, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
APPROPRIATION 31-51 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997) (discussing
appropriation of African American musical forms); K.J. Greene, Copyright,
Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 339 (1999) (commenting on use of copyright to appropriate African
American music).
3

See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298,

§ 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(2003) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976)); see also Brief Amici Curiae
of The American Association of Publishers, Amberson Holdings LLC, Richard
Avedon, The George Balanchine Trust, Peter Bartok, Boosey & Hawkes, Inc.,
The Aaron Copland Fund for Music, Inc. European-American Music
Corporation, The George Gershwin Family Trust, The Leonore S. Gershwin
Trust for the Benefit of the Ira and Leonore Gershwin Philanthropic Fund, The
Leonore S. Gershwin Trust for the Benefit of the Library of Congress, The Keith
Haring Foundation, The Frederick Lowe Foundation, Inc., David Mamet, Glen
Roven, The Kurt Weill Foundation for Music, In Support of the Respondents,
Eldred v. Ashcroft (hereinafter, “Trust Brief”).
4

Ira Gershwin, George Gershwin’s older brother, wrote lyrics for many of the

works composed by George Gershwin and is thus a co-author for many of
George Gershwin’s works. Throughout this paper, the identities of George
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Bess, which premiered in 1935 shortly before Gershwin’s premature death
at age 38 in 1937. Gershwin is an excellent case to consider with respect
to uses of copyright because of his success, prominence and the uses of
copyright by him and his heirs. Gershwin interests have also played a role
in shaping copyright law and were closely involved in the legislative
process that led to extensions of copyright duration in both discussions
leading to the general revision of the Copyright Act in 1976 and the later
passage of the CTEA.5 As such, their uses of copyright reflect the
behaviors employed today by individual copyright holders and other
business and commercial interests that hold significant copyrights.
George Gershwin’s commercial success at least partially reflected his able
uses of copyright and willingness to embrace new technologies such as
radio and new methods of business practice in the face of changing
technological and industry standards.6 Examination of the creation and
uses of copyright in this specific context helps shed light on how
copyrighted works may be created and the sources from which holders of
such rights actually derive value. These uses of copyright in turn can be
drawn on to further assess the scope of rights that accompany copyright,
not just in relation to duration, but also in terms of the effective rights of
exclusion (sometimes termed monopoly rights) granted to copyright
Gershwin’s identified co-authors are only noted when relevant to discussion.
Further, figures for revenues to Gershwin family members of Gershwin family
controlled entities typically reflect revenues on account of the authorship of both
George and Ira Gershwin, unless otherwise stated.
5

The George Gershwin Family Trust, The Leonore Gershwin Philanthropic Fund and the

Leonore Gershwin Trust for the Benefit of the Library of Congress all participated in the
Trust Brief, supra note 3.
6

See infra notes 82 to 85 and accompanying text.

Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Copyright on Catfish Row

7

holders.
Changes in copyright duration have serious implications for the treatment
of copyright by heirs and legal successors following the death of a creator.
This means that in addition to looking at uses of copyright during the life
of creators of copyright protected works, consideration must be given to
how such works are protected following the deaths of creators. Since
copyright duration now extends to essentially one lifetime beyond the
lifetime of the individual creator of a copyrighted work, post-mortem
industries connected to creators may develop, thrive and have new life
even in the death of the figure upon which such industries are based. Such
post-mortem legacies are often evident in the case of heirs, for whom the
maintenance and protection of the artistic legacies of dead creators is a
core business interest.7 As is the case with living creators, such artistic
legacies may make use of various legal rights, including rights that
emanate from copyright, right of publicity and provisions of the Lanham
Act, for example.8 This Article focuses on the implications of uses of
copyright by both living composers as well as the managers of postmortem artistic legacies that may also have rights emanating from

7

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Elvis Industry and the Cultures of Elvis: :

Borrowing, Icons and Intellectual Property (2006) (manuscript on file with
author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Elvis”).
8

See, e.g., Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *3 (C.D.

Cal., 1980) (discussing invasion of Ira Gershwin’s right of publicity on account of dramatic
live stage production of ‘Let's Call the Whole Thing Gershwin”); Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co. (ABC), 583 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding violation of Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act by ABC on account of ABC’s modifications of Monty Python comic
sketches).
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copyright.9
Because of his early death, George Gershwin represents an early example
of a post-mortem artistic legacy at a time when copyright duration was
shorter. The uses of copyright by Gershwin and his heirs can thus shed
light on the operation of post-mortem artistic legacies in today’s copyright
environment. Consideration of Gershwin’s composition practices and the
treatment of his musical legacy by his heirs also lends support to the
benefits of separating the control and compensation elements of postmortem artistic legacies.10
Part I of this Article focuses on assumptions often made with respect to
the creation of copyrighted works and particularly the extent to which
rights of control and compensation are treated as linked and inherent parts
of the rights of copyright holders. Part II looks at the creation of Porgy
and Bess, discussing George Gershwin’s musical borrowings in Porgy and
Bess and other works. Part III concentrates on the uses of copyright by the
Gershwin trusts that control Porgy and Bess and other copyrights of
George Gershwin and his brother Ira, who often acted as George
Gershwin’s lyricist. Part IV examines the implications of the social and
cultural contexts of copyright for the creation of works such as Porgy and
Bess and the significance of control exercised and evident in various uses
9

This Article focuses on the uses of copyright and does not consider other rights such as

moral rights that involve recognition of “interests of authors and artists in their work that
are separate from copyright” and that may be retained even after transfer of an author or
artist’s copyright to third parties. See Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, Authors’ and
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 95,
95 (1997).
10

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.
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of copyright. Part V discusses alternative transmission based liability rule
approaches to music copyright that may be a basis upon which to
determine copyright infringement by which the control and compensation
aspects of copyright frameworks might be disaggregated.
I.
A.

COPYRIGHT, CREATION AND CONTROL

The Scope and Duration of Copyright

Treatment of borrowings within copyright law is increasingly of concern
given the progressive expansion of copyright duration and breadth during
the twentieth century.11 This increase in duration is evident in copyright
treatment of the piano concerto Rhapsody in Blue, one of George
Gershwin’s most famous and lucrative works. At its creation in 1924,
Rhapsody in Blue was entitled to a maximum of 56 years of copyright
protection under the 1909 Copyright Act,12 which would have meant that
its copyright would have originally expired in 1980. As a result of
lobbying by copyright industries and copyright heirs, the 1976 general
revision to United States Copyright Law (as amended, the “Copyright
Act”) extended the duration of copyright protection of existing works,
11

See Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the

Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491,
518 (1999) (“Congress has repeatedly extended the breadth and scope of
copyright protection, straining the meaning of the phrase ‘for limited times’ well
beyond any historical recognition”).
12

Under the 1909 Copyright Act, Rhapsody in Blue would have been entitled to

an initial 28 year term and one 28 year renewal term. See Section 24, Copyright
Act of 1909, ch. 320, superceded by the Copyright Act of 1976, 35 Stat. 1075,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011010 (2003)).
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giving Rhapsody in Blue an additional nineteen years of copyright
protection until 1999.13 A number of profitable works, including those of
George Gershwin and a number of prominent Disney characters, were
then scheduled to lose copyright protection in and around the late 1990s.14
Not surprisingly, commercial interests that derive revenue from ownership
of copyrights and that include copyright heirs and content providers, again
sought to expand the duration of their copyrights and licensing revenue
streams. Such behaviors reflect strategic uses of intellectual property
through legislative enforcementthat have become increasingly common in
recent years.15 Their efforts had their desired effect and helped ensure
passage of the CTEA.
As a result of the CTEA, Rhapsody in Blue is now protected by copyright

13

See Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the

Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 2023 (2002) (noting lobbying by copyright industries with respect to the Copyright
Act of 1976, which gave existing works that previously were entitled to a
maximum of 56 years of protection a new term of life plus 50 years); E. Scott
Johnson, Law Gives Copyright New Life, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 8, 1999, at C12
(noting that copyright protection would have expired for Rhapsody in Blue on
December 31, 1999 without the Copyright Term Extension Act).
14

See infra notes 20 to 21 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text; see also Olufunmilayo B.

Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition: Intangibles, Intellectual Property
and Innovation (2005) (manuscript on file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa,
Strategic Behaviors”); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
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until December 31, 2019,16 giving a total of 85 years of copyright
protection to this work. Although the increase in duration does give
Gershwin’s heirs an additional 20-year stream of licensing revenues, it
also extends the period of time during which his heirs can exercise broad
control over uses of this and other Gershwin works. This exercise of
control by Gershwin heirs and other copyright holders can impede the
creation of future works and significantly limit reinterpretations of
existing works.17 Moreover, the expansion of copyright duration has little
to do with incentives to create new works, particularly in Gershwin’s case,
since he can no longer create new works. It is highly questionable
whether such expansion significantly expands incentives to create works
for existing creators either. Even if such expansion does increase
incentives for existing creators, the costs of this expansion are potentially
quite high both with respect to the public domain, those who seek to
interpret existing works as well as creators of new works who base their
creations on existing works.
The potential costs of extending copyright duration suggests that on
balance the current scope of copyright needs to be tempered at a minimum
by reducing in certain instances the control rights that accompany
copyright protection and significantly limiting the expansion in duration to
rights that relate to compensation for uses of protected works.18 This
would entail significantly reducing or eliminating the control rights
granted to heirs and others who control post-mortem artistic legacies under
16

See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 23 (noting that the copyright on Rhapsody in

Blue will not expire until December 31, 2019).
17

See infra notes 206 to 252and accompanying text

18

See infra notes 310 to 330 and accompanying text.
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copyright laws. The scope of copyright interests of such post-mortem
legacies would thus be limited in most cases to an economic rights with a
reduction of rights of control of future uses of copyrighted material.
B.

Copyright Discourse and the CTEA: General and Specific
Instances of Copyright Use

The CTEA represents a significant event in the history of American
copyright law.19 The CTEA lengthened the term of copyright protection
in the United States by 20 years, extending copyright protection to 70
years beyond the life of individual creators of copyrighted works,20
leading it to be called the “Mickey Mouse” Law on account of its rescuing
Mickey Mouse from becoming part of the public domain.21 The
19

See Christina N. Gifford, Note: The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension

Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 378 (2000) (“The CTEA is one of the most drastic
changes in copyright law since the current Copyright Act took effect in 1978.”);
Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The
Copyright Term Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the
Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 193 (2004),
available at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n2/Langvardt.pdf.
20

See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I

Stayed Too Long?”, 52 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000) (discussing the one-sided
nature of much of the Congressional testimony associated with passage of the
CTEA and the fact that the CTEA extension is both prospective and
retrospective in application).
21

See Dennis Harney, Note: Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of the U.S.

Constitution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 291, 291 (2002) (noting that
Mickey Mouse will now enter the public domain in 2024 instead of 2004 as a
result of the CTEA); Gifford, supra note 19, at 385 (noting that Michael Eisner
went to lobby personally for passage of the CTEA); FREE EXPRESSION POLICY
PROJECT, “THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”: WHY COPYRIGHT
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importance of the CTEA is reflected in the resources that were directed
toward both assuring and preventing its passage and the atypical alliances
that arose to challenge its passage.22 The dispute concerning the CTEA
continued in court after its passage, culminating most recently in the case
Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the CTEA.23
Not surprisingly, CTEA proponents were weighed heavily toward the
copyright industries and content providers; the briefs presented to the
Supreme Court in favor of upholding the CTEA in Eldred included briefs
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association, AOL Time
TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 2 (2003) (discussing the
aggressive campaign by Disney and other companies promoting term extension)
(hereinafter, “FEP, Intellectual Freedom”); Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free
Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright Act of
1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254 (2003) (arguing that Disney Mickey
Mouse copyrights are void on account of Disney’s failure to meet copyright
notice requirements applicable at the time of publication); Phyllis Schafly, Why
Disney Has Clout with the Republican Congress, Nov. 28, 1998 (noting that the
following Disney copyrights were soon to expire without the CTEA, including
Mickey Mouse (2003), Pluto (2005), Goofy (2007) and Donald Duck (2009),
making the CTEA worth billions to Disney), at
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1998/nov98/98-11-25.html.
22

The opponents of the CTEA cut across ideological and other divisions and

included law professors, libraries, archives, economists and Phyllis Schafly’s
Eagle Forum, for example. See Brief of Amici Curiae Eagle Forum Education
& Legal Defense Fund and The Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons, Inc. In Support Of Petitioners.
23

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (holding that Congress acted

within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in passing
the CTEA).
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Warner, the Association of American Publishers, Dr. Seuss Enterprises,
the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry
Association of America, the Songwriters Guild of America and a number
of estates, foundations, representatives or other entities associated with
prominent composers and lyricists, including Aaron Copland, George
Gershwin, Ira Gershwin, Bela Bartok, Richard Rogers, Frederick Lowe,
Arnold Schoenberg and Kurt Weill.24 In contrast, briefs opposing
upholding the CTEA reflected contributions from law professors,25
economists,26 libraries and archives and others, including Intel
Corporation and the Free Software Foundation.27
24

See, e.g., Trust Brief, supra note 3; Brief for AOL Time Warner as Amicus

Curiae in Support of Respondents, Eldred v. Ashcroft, Brief of Amici Curiae of
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.; CCH Incorporated; Houghton Mifflin
Company, Inc.; The Mcgraw-Hill Companies; Reed Elsevier Inc.; and the
Software & Information Industry Association In Support of Respondent.
25

See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in Support of

Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618; Brief Amici Curiae of Copyright Law
Professors in Support of Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
26

Brief Amici Curiae of Economics Professors in Support of Petition, Eldred v.

Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (hereinafter, “Economist Brief”).
27

See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of The American Association of Law Libraries,

American Historical Association, American Library Association, Art Libraries
Society of North America, Association For Recorded Sound Collections,
Association of Research Libraries, Council on Library And Information
Resources , International Association of Jazz Record Collectors, Medical
Library Association, Midwest Archives Conference, Music Library Association,
National Council on Public History, Society For American Music, Society of
American Archivists , and Special Libraries Association, In Support of the
Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft (discussing the constitutionality of the CTEA and
its implications for the public domain); Statement of Timothy Phillips in
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The debate over the CTEA reflects the significant commercial and
economic interests affected by its terms. Estimates suggest that extension
of copyright protection may be valued at as much as $330 million a year
for copyright holders by 2017.28 While supporters of the CTEA have
emphasized the incentives that copyright gives to creation of new works,
much of the discourse of opponents of the CTEA has focused on assessing
the general impact of copyright duration on the public domain and the
creation of future works.29
While general perspectives with respect to copyright rules may be
instructive, looking at the uses of copyright in specific instances by
copyright holders can shed light on how copyrighted works are actually
created, maintained and controlled by their holders. In addition, the
dialogue that emerged surrounding the CTEA necessarily entails
Opposition to Copyright Term Extension (discussing the implications of the
CTEA term extension) , at
http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjala/commentary/PhillipsStmt.html.
28

See Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic

Values, Congressional Research Service Report 98-144 E (1998) (estimating
that annual royalties for works that will not enter the public domain as a result of
the CTEA will be $50 million by 2002 and $330 million per year by 2017 (at
1997 prices) or $59 million by 2002 and $389 million in 2017 in 2004 dollars).
Determination of 2005 dollars was made based on the applicable Consumer
Price Index (CPI) in the years since the year of payment. Calculations were
made using the calculation engine at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank
website at http://minneapolisfed.org/Research/data/us/calc/index.cfm.
29

See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Nadine Farid, Not In My Library:

Eldred v. Ashcroft and the Demise of the Public Domain, 5 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 15 (2003) (noting disregard for the public domain inherent in
the CTEA).
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consideration of the core goals of copyright law in general. Although the
goals of copyright law are often discussed in connection with the creation
of new works, as CTEA opponents have emphasized, copyright has a
profound influence on the creation of future works and the ability of future
creators to use existing works. Consequently, copyright law should be
constructed to permit borrowing that enables the creation of future works
as well as provide compensation to creators of prior works on which such
future works are based.
In focusing on the general implications of copyright laws, much discourse
surrounding the CTEA assesses the impact of the CTEA on both copyright
holders and the public domain. The extensive commentary surrounding
the Eldred case, which focused particularly on the constitutionality of the
CTEA,30 reflects arguments on both sides of the CTEA debate.31 Within
discourse surrounding the CTEA and Eldred, two particular themes may
be extracted. On the one hand, a significant theme emphasized by
supporters of the CTEA relates to the compensatory aspect of copyright as
a tool of innovation related to acts of creation that is intended to both

30

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

31

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller & William M. Patry, The

Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. SYMPOSIA (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and
Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 83, 95 (2002) (noting the CTEA violates the First Amendment and prevents
expression that would otherwise occur); Dan T. Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends
Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 96
(2002).
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incentivize and reward creators. 32 This approach emphasizes the
incentives that give impetus to potential creators to create new works.33
In contrast, although often also rooted in the copyright as tool of
innovation approach, opponents of the CTEA have tended to take note to a
greater extent of actual behaviors with respect to copyright over time
periods other than in relation to the moment of creation of a copyrighted
work. As such, they focus in greater depth on issues related to control and
consider some implications of the process by which copyrights are
actually used over time and the impact of copyright laws on the creation of
new works.34 This view evident in discourse of CTEA opponents focuses

32

See Davis, supra note 3, at 998-999 (discussing the appeal of heirs of

individual composers in Congressional hearings who focused on the economic
losses they would suffer without passage of the CTEA); Gifford, supra note 19,
at 392-397 (noting that in addition to global competition and harmonization with
the European Union, “[t]he final rationale cited by supporters of the CTEA is
that a longer term of protection would serve as a greater incentive for creation of
artistic and literary works.”); see also supra note 27 and infra note 224 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the arguments of amici curiae for the
respondents in the Eldred case.
33

See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of

Copyright, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325 (1989); Hansman & Santilli, supra note 9, at
___; Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA
167 (1934); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale
of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); see also Arewa, Strategic
Behaviors, supra note 15 (discussing the intellectual property as tool of
innovation approach).
34

See L. Ray Patterson, Case Comment: Eldred v. Reno: An Example Of The

Law Of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 238 (2001)
(noting monopolistic control aspects of early statutes dealing with literary works
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particular attention on the effect of copyright rules on the public domain.
Considerations of copyright from both sides of the CTEA debate have
tended to approach consideration of the issues raised by the CTEA from a
macro and rule-focused perspective that seeks to delineate the general
implications of copyright rules for the public domain and creation of new
works. Further, much of this discourse largely assumes that the control
and compensation elements of copyright are necessarily linked. By
focusing on the implications of copyright rules in general, such
commentary does not as a result fully consider the significance of actual
uses of copyright in relation to the stated rationales for copyright in the
first place. In addition, such discourse does not fully take into account the
extent to which the value of a copyright for its holder may inhere in uses
of copyright that have little or nothing to do with the creation of new
works and the implications of this for behaviors evident with respect to
copyright.35
Although such general considerations are no doubt valuable, looking at
specific instances of the uses of copyright can also be instructive. In the
music area, looking at both the creation and uses of copyrighted works in
particular instances can illuminate much about the actual working of
copyright in specific contexts. In the case of George Gershwin’s works,
including the opera Porgy and Bess, such examination can reveal
something about the origins of Gershwin’s works and his musical
such as the English Licensing Act of 1662); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
35

The Economist Brief, however, did address issues relating to the behavioral

impact of particular copyright rule structures. See Economist Brief, supra note
26, at ___.
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borrowings,36 the extent to which collaborators and the sources of
borrowings were compensated or acknowledged by Gershwin and the uses
of copyright both by Gershwin as well as the entities that have held
Gershwin copyrights since his death.
C.

Strategic Uses of Copyright

The ways in which holders of Gershwin’s copyright have maintained,
enforced and expanded their effect rights reflect general copyright
strategies used by copyright holders today. Particularly relevant are the
strategic business behaviors that increasingly characterize the exercise of
intellectual property right frameworks. Such behaviors highlight areas in
which assumptions and assertions about the goals, purposes and uses of
copyright do not always fully map onto observed behaviors in the
copyright realm.
1.

The Complexity of Motivations to Create New Works

Assertions about the benefits of intellectual property frameworks are
typically based on an implicit acceptance of the fundamental notion that
intellectual property frameworks have the beneficial effect of promoting
innovation. Those on both sides of the CTEA debate appear to accept at
least in principle the proposition that copyright actually creates incentives
to create new works, an assumption that is not really empirically
supported.37 While copyright may provide such incentives to create in
36

Musical borrowing entails the use of existing cultural elements or works in

creations. See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1, at ___-___ (discussing musical
borrowing).
37

See, e.g., RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE, AND REWARD : AN

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
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some instances, the actual processes by which new works are created are
often complex. The motivations that might be extracted from the behavior
of George Gershwin, for example, would reflect a composer who was
inspired by both financial and other considerations. Although Gershwin
might have been motivated by money and royalties in some instances,
particularly with respect to his popular music songwriting, he was also
clearly impelled to create new works for reasons that had little if anything
to do with financial considerations and even invested his own money in
works that had no assurance of financial success.38 This reflects the fact
that people create new works for a variety of reasons and motivations.39

21 (2001) (“we still cannot say with any conviction that intellectual property law
in general, and copyright law in particular, stimulates creativity. That is no
argument for not having it but it should sound loud notes of caution about
increasing it. And we still know very little about its empirical effects.”); Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights
Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 505 fn. 160 (1998-1999) (noting that the
role of copyright in the production of cultural texts remains an unanswered
empirical question); Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic Justification for
(and thus Constitutionality of) Copyright Law’s Prohibition Against
Unauthorized Copying: §106 (January 2003), AEI-Brookings Joint Center
Related Publication 03-1 (noting that economic justification for copyright
prohibition against unauthorized copying is not be necessary to stimulate an
optimal level of new creations and in fact appears to have a net negative effect
on creative output).
38

This is particularly true in the case of Gershwin’s later works, including Porgy

and Bess, which was not a commissioned work and in which Gershwin invested
his own money. See John Andrew Johnson, Gershwin’s Blue Monday (1922)
and the Promise of Success, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE
MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 111, 111 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999).
39

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15.
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In addition, regardless of whether copyrights gives incentives to create a
work, subsequent to their creation, intellectual property rights such as
copyright may in fact also be used as strategic weapons in a manner that
may actually impede the creation of future works.40
2.

Intellectual Property and Strategic Business Behaviors

Aggressive and strategic behaviors are increasingly associated with the
use and enforcement of intellectual property rights.41 These behaviors are
in part a result of the transition in developed countries from a tangible
industrial production economic paradigm to an intangible paradigm based
on information technology.42 This move to the digital economy era has
“increased the stakes in the global dimensions of intellectual property
rights.”43 Two recent examples of the use of copyright reflect this trend.
In the case of peer-to-peer file sharing, for example, the Recording
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) has aggressively pursued
alleged copyright infringers in large numbers. By June 2004, the RIAA
had initiated more than 2,000 lawsuits against alleged file sharers for
40

Id.; see also DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY

AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER

(2004) (highlighting the

fact that intellectual property frameworks have been used historically in the
international intellectual property arena as a tool of piracy).
41

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15.

42

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation in the Knowledge

Economy: Adopting Disclosure Frameworks for a New Intangibles Age, 54
BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Knowledge Economy”).
43

See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications

of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENVER J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 109, 119 (1995) Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15; Arewa,
Knowledge Economy, supra note 42.
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copyright infringement.44 In another example, following passage of the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”),45 companies
immediately began to use the DMCA as a competitive weapon for
purposes that had essentially nothing to do with the creation of new works,
but more to do with the prevention of competition.46
These and other examples suggest that aggressive and often strategic
business behaviors are increasingly a part of the use of copyright and
44

As of June 22, 2004, 2,047 “John Doe” lawsuits had been filed targeting

groups of suspected copyright infringers. See Congressional Budget Office,
Copyright Issues in Digital Media 19 (Aug. 2004), at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf (hereinafter,
“CBO”); see also Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales (March 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar?papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf) (finding that
file sharing has an effect on music sales that is statistically indistinguishable
from zero).
45

Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.

28, 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §1201 et seq.).
46

See FEP, Intellectual Freedom, supra note 21, at 32 (“The DMCA has also

become a weapon for companies seeking to squelch competition.”); Dan L.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1110-1114 (2003)
(noting that under the DMCA strategic behaviors were used to “suppress
competing technology by preventing interoperability with products that include
technical protections,” rather than protect innovation or prevent unauthorized
copying or distribution of copyrighted works); Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles,
Will Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control, Free
Expression Policy Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University
Law School 4-5 (2005), at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (noting chilling
effect of DMCA Section 512 takedown letters) (hereinafter, FEP, Fair Use).
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intellectual property rights in general. Such behaviors may be exemplified
by both actual legal actions as well as the threat of legal action through
licensing letters or cease and desist letters.47 Threats of legal action have
the potential to cause a chilling effect because allegations of infringement
may in the end differ little in their effects on the behavior of the party
deemed to infringe than in cases of actual infringement.48 As a result,
threats can be important avenues for strategic behaviors.
Although strategic behaviors are by no means a new phenomenon,49 the
intangibles paradigm facilitates such behaviors by virtue of the increasing
divergence between systems of rules (the “rules of the game”) and
observed behaviors associated with such rules (the “manner of play”).50
47

FEP, Fair Use, supra note 46, at 4-5, 36-37 (noting potential chilling effect of cease and

desist letters and other enforcement practices of copyright holders)
48

See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of

Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009,
1030 fn. 78 (1990) (Review of PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW
AND PRACTICE (1989))

(“At issue here, however, is the chilling effect on artists,

and artists are not usually copyright experts. Thus, the fact that a work could be
a potential infringement is as important in practical terms as actual
infringement.”); see also Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15.
49

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15.

50

Id. (noting difference between rules of the game or formal legal rules and

regulations that constitute intellectual property frameworks and the manner of
play, which refers to “how participants subject to such game rules interpret and
transform these rules in actual play and the implications of such transformations
for the game and consequently system of rules themselves”); see also Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 947 (1995)
(“governments, as well as others, act to construct the social structures, or social
norms, or . . . the social meanings that surround us”); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 17-18 (1984) (“Rules are often thought of in
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Such rules of the game, which include copyright rules, developed under a
tangible asset paradigm economic and business model associated with the
nineteenth and much of the twentieth century.51 Consequently, such rules
do not always adequately contemplate the reality of behaviors and value
assignments, including those evident under the intangibles paradigm
associated with the era of digital copyright.52 This disjuncture between
rules and practice is by no means limited to the exercise of intellectual
property rights. It is also an important aspect of the transition of legal
rules in the knowledge economy in other legal spheres as well.53
D.

Copyright, Strategic Behavior and Value

Views that focus on the incentives copyright gives for the creation of new
works are based on assumptions about how copyright holders derive value

connection with games, as formalized prescriptions. The rules implicated in the
reproduction of social systems are not generally like this. Even those which are
codified as laws are characteristically subject to a far greater diversity of
contestations than the rules of the game. Although the use of the rules of the
game such as chess, etc. as prototypical of the rule-governed properties of social
systems is frequently associated with Wittgenstein, more relevant is what
Wittgenstein has to say about children’s play as exemplifying the routines of
social life.”).
51

See Arewa, Knowledge Economy, supra note 42.

52

Id.

53

Id. at ___ (discussing the implications of the intangibles paradigm for securities law and

accounting frameworks); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private
Offerings in the Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37
U. TOL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing some implications of the cyberspace
era for securities regulation).
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from copyright.54 Although compensation for creation of a new work may
be a source of value for copyright holders,55 strategic behaviors suggest
that the use of copyright reflects a process over time rather than
necessarily only in relation to a specific moment of creation.56
Furthermore, copyright holders also derive value from copyright in a
number of ways in relation to the use of copyright over time that may have
little to do with the creation of the work itself, but rather in how they can
expand and manipulate the scope of existing rights through various means,
including both judicial and legislative enforcement.57 As a result, it is
likely that prominent copyright holders will again seek to extend the
length of copyright duration when the twenty-year extension given them
by the CTEA is close to expiring.58 The actions of such holders highlights
the strategic behaviors commonly asserted in the intellectual property
realm today more generally, including through both judicial and legislative
enforcement.
1.

Strategic Behavior and Judicial Enforcement

Judicial enforcement may be evident in a number of behaviors, including
actual suit or the threat of suit, sending of cease and desist letters, suits

54

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“’By establishing a marketable right to the

use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas’”) (citing Harper & Rowe, Publishes, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539, 558 (1985))
55

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-219 (discussing copyright incentives and the nature of

copyright’s limited monopoly).
56

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.

57

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.

58

See Garon, supra note 11, at ___.
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against large numbers of people as is evident in the case of RIAA suits59
and the recent Bridgeport cases where some 800 defendants were sued.60
The recent SCO case illustrates the use of judicial enforcement to expand
existing rights connected to copyright in a business context.61 The
ongoing SCO-Linux dispute exemplifies aggressive strategic behavior
with respect to intangibles. This dispute involves claims by The SCO
Group,62 with respect to open source Linux technology, which has been
alleged by SCO to infringe upon copyrights, not actually owned by SCO,
with respect to proprietary Unix technology.63 SCO’s assertion of rights
has involved its sending letters to more than 1,500 companies in the
United States and overseas demanding that these companies pay SCO
licensing fees on account of their use of Linux.64 These licensing letters
were followed by several lawsuits, some of which were filed against
recipients of SCO licensing letters.65

59

See supra note 43and accompanying text.

60

See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18810 (6th Cir.

2004); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Boutit, 101 Fed. Appx. 76 (6th Cir. 2004); Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2003); Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
61

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (noting that one complication

in the SCO case relates to accusations that SCO is being used by Microsoft to
attack open source code Linux technology that Microsoft sees as a threat to its
proprietary Windows operating system).
62

The SCO Group (“SCO”) bought its Unix business in 1995. Unix copyrights were

explicitly excluded from the transaction. See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15.
63

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 for a more comprehensive discussion of

the SCO-Linux dispute.
64

Id.

65

Id.
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Judicial enforcement of copyright may involve behaviors that have little to
do with the creation of new works or the commercialization or distribution
of such works. Rather, judicial enforcement efforts may reflect the value
that may be derived from intellectual property rights that may come from
the expansion of the effective scope of existing rights instead of the
creation of new works.66 In addition, such actions are often used by
companies to signal the value of intangibles to markets.67
Strategic judicial enforcement may reflect different value assignments
than the copyright as tool of innovation approach might assume. Such an
approach implicitly presumes that the value of a copyright for its holder
largely rests in some type of commercial exploitation or distribution of a
work, which is the fundamental basis for accepted views of copyright as
giving incentives to create new works. In contrast, strategic uses of
copyright often reflect a value in copyright derived from utilization of
copyright with respect to other concurrently or potentially existing rights
or commercial uses. Strategic behaviors may consequently be used, for
example, in the intellectual property arena to block other products or

66

Id. (noting that SCO seeks to enforce rights in relation to Unix copyrights held

by Novell, which rights SCO may have acquired when Novell sold the Unix
business to a predecessor company of SCO).
67

See David S. Gelb & Philip Siegel, Intangible Assets and Corporate

Signaling, 15 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCOUNTING 307, 321 (2000) (noting
that as a result of differential accounting treatment of intangibles, companies
with significant amounts of intangible assets “face the rather formidable task of
credibly signaling firm value to investors and shareholders”); see also Arewa,
Knowledge Economy, supra note 42 (discussing failure of accounting measures
to adequately measure or account for the role played by intangibles today).
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competitors.68
By focusing on copyright with respect to acts of creation, the copyright as
tool of innovation approach does not adequately encompass the range of
copyright behaviors over time reflected in the manner of play that forms
an important part of the actual operation of the rules of the game.
Although judicial enforcement is typically sought with respect to
individual cases, such enforcement attempts can have broader implications
for the scope of rights of other copyright holders by virtue of legal
precedents that might be established in such cases.
2.

Strategic Behavior and Legislative Enforcement

In addition to using judicial enforcement to expand the scope of
intellectual property rights through legal action or the threat of such
action, strategic behavior as is also evident in the legislative arena.69

68

See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15; see also supra notes 45 to 46

and accompanying text for a discussion of strategic behavior in connection with
the DMCA.
69

Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, Court Decisions and Equity

Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection 19-20 (2004)
(manuscript on file with author) (finding in empirical study that “excess returns
to equity are driven, in part, by the breadth of copyright as determined by
courts,” whereas lengthening of the statutory term provides little incentive due
to the increased cost of creating derivative works); see also Economist Brief,
supra note 26 (giving an economic analysis of the CTEA from the perspective of
CTEA opponents); Liebowitz, Stan J. and Margolis, Stephen E., "Seventeen
Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and
Network Effects" [19] (December 2003). http://ssrn.com/abstract=488085
(noting lack of consideration of “the responsiveness of creative efforts to
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Another avenue for the use of strategic behaviors with respect to
intellectual property relates to use of the legislative process to promote
statutory changes. Such statutory changes may increase the scope or
duration of copyright protection with respect to typically broader groups
of holders than might often be the case in instances of judicial
enforcement. Copyright has historically been used by commercial
interests to promote a legal framework that maximizes the value of their
investments in copyright.70
Legislative enforcement may relate to the creation of new rights or
expansion of existing rights and may affect both new and existing works.71
As is the case with judicial enforcement, legislative expansion with
respect to existing and new rights often results in expansion of such rights
with respect to other potential concurrent users. In the case of the CTEA,
the potential users who had less expansive rights as a result of the CTEA
included potential users of the public domain, borrowers who use existing
works and those who reinterpret existing works whose scope of rights was
lessened because of the CTEA.
marginal incentives and the function of ownership of intellectual property
beyond the incentive to create”).
70

Jessica Litman, Innovation and the Information Environment: Revising

Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1996) (“Until
now, our copyright law has been addressed primarily to commercial and
institutional actors who participated in copyright-related businesses.”); Arewa,
Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the role of commercial interests in shaping
copyright law).
71

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95, 200 (noting that the 1790, 1831, 1909 and 1976

copyright acts all applied new copyright terms to new and existing works so that all under
copyright protection could be “governed evenhandedly under the same regime”).
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The promotion of statutory changes through legislative enforcement as a
means to expand copyright protection thus parallels to a large extent the
strategic business behaviors evident in attempts to seek or threaten judicial
enforcement of intellectual property rights in business settings. Both types
of enforcement may function to expand in effect some aspect of the rights
that inhere in copyright, including breadth, scope and duration. The
activities of the proponents of the CTEA from the copyright industries
reflect these types of strategic behaviors. The economic gains to be
realized from expansion of copyright duration were no doubt a critical
factor underlying the activities of CTEA proponents.72
II.

THE MUSICAL ORIGINS OF PORGY AND BESS

Consideration of varieties of strategic behavior in the copyright context
shines a needed spotlight on the behavioral aspects of copyright
enforcement. Such behavioral aspects illustrate the ways in which
copyright owners maintain, reinforce and at times expand the scope of the
intellectual property rights held by them. The uses of copyright by George
Gershwin and the Gershwin family reflect the uses of copyright for a
variety of purposes reflecting varied value assignments. Any
consideration of creation in the case of Gershwin’s compositions must
begin with a discussion of the musical origins of George Gershwin’s
works, including his seminal opera Porgy and Bess.
A.

The Creation and Development of the Music and Libretto

George Gershwin is the most successful and renowned American

72

See infra notes 28 to 29 and accompanying text.
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composer in American history.73 He had unparalleled popular stature at
the time of his premature death in 1937, whose impact has been compared
to John Lennon’s death in 1980.74 His life was the subject of Hollywood
treatment in the 1945 film Rhapsody in Blue.75
His success may be measured both in terms of both his artistic and
financial accomplishments. Gershwin composed a number of successful
Broadway musical during his short career.76 The financial success of

73

See THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER xi (Robert Wyatt & John Andrew

Johnson eds., 2004) (hereinafter, “THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER”) (“During
his lifetime, George Gershwin (1898-1937) achieved an almost unprecedented
level of success marked by an international reputation, massive wealth, celebrity
status, and an uncanny means of attracting attention.”); Charles Hamm, Towards
a New Reading of Gershwin, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE
MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 3, 3 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (“The United
States has not produced a more famous composer than George Gershwin”); New
George Gershwin, in __ THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS ___ (Stanley Sadie ed. 2001) (“Remarkably, Gershwin broadened
his musical scope without sacrificing his popularity. Free of false modesty, he
reveled in success, which he accepted as no more than his due. By the early
1930s his fame, earning power, and the range of his works made Gershwin
unique among American composers.”) (hereinafter, “New Grove, Gershwin”).
74

Susan Richardson, Gershwin on the Cover of Rolling Stone, in THE

GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 161, 168
(Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (“His untimely death was felt throughout society,
causing shock and public grief comparable to that over John Lennon’s death in
1980.”).
75

Id.

76

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin left Jerome H.

Remick & Co., a music publishing firm on Tin Pan Alley, in March 1917 and began
working as rehearsal pianist for Miss 1917, a show by Jerome Kern and Victor Herbert, and
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Gershwin’s works did not end with his death in 1937, but rather continued
to grow. Porgy and Bess, composed shortly before Gershwin’s death and
described as a folk opera in its first performances during Gershwin’s
lifetime,77 did not receive much critical acclaim until well after
Gershwin’s death.78 The reception of Porgy and Bess typified the
generally negative critical reception of Gershwin’s more “serious” works
during his lifetime.79 The value of many Gershwin works, including
Porgy and Bess, as “serious” music is now increasingly acknowledged.80

by his 21st birthday had “a Broadway show on the boards, several songs in print, and a
prestigious publisher awaiting more.”).
77

See George Gershwin, Rhapsody in Catfish Row, in GEORGE GERSHWIN 72,

72 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (noting that Porgy and Bess was called a folk
opera because it was a folk tale and the music was folk music that was written
by Gershwin based upon original folk material).
78

See infra notes 143 to 151 and accompanying text.

79

JOAN PEYSER, THE MEMORY OF ALL THAT: THE LIFE OF GEORGE GERSHWIN

193, 214 (1998) (noting that Gershwin was held in contempt by serious
American composers as well as critics, academics and European conductors).
80

Larry Starr, Ives, Gershwin, and Copland, Reflections on the Strange History

of American Art Music, 12 AM. MUSIC 167, 186 (1994) (“Gershwin is at last
being treated seriously by many”) (hereinafter, “Starr, Art Music”); Hans Keller,
Gershwin’s Genius, 103 MUSICAL TIMES 763 (1962) (discussing Gershwin’s
genius); Larry Starr, Toward a Reevaluation of Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess, 2
AM. MUSIC 25 (1984) (discussing musicologist Starr’s surprise at the
accomplishments of Gershwin in Porgy and Bess after seeing the Houston
Grand Opera production of Porgy and Bess in New York in 1977); HOLLIS
ALPERT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PORGY AND BESS: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN
CLASSIC 5 (1990) (noting initially negative response to what would become
“regarded as this country’s greatest contribution to opera, and would later
conquer many of Europe’s most prestigious opera stages”).
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Gershwin’s works have achieved continuing financial success that is often
attributed to the appeal of his melodies.81 Moreover, Gershwin’s financial
success was bolstered by his ability to take advantage of changing
business structures and technology in the musical arena of his time.82 For
example, he gave radio performances of his and others’ works,83 which
helped ensure widespread distribution and public awareness of his
works.84 In addition, Gershwin was also able to benefit from changing
industry business structures and the increased financial clout of
81

Steven E. Gilbert, Gershwin’s Art of Counterpoint, 70 MUSICAL Q. 423, 425

(1984) (“Most of Gershwin’s tunes are indeed memorable.”); Larry Starr,
Gershwin’s ‘Bess, You Is My Woman Now’: The Sophistication and Subtlety of a
Great Tune, 72 MUSICAL Q. 429, 430 (1986) (noting that Gerwhsin was “a
fabulous melodist”); New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (“The
melodies of Gershwin’s concert works are surely the chief reason for their
appeal.”).
82

See George Gershwin, The Composer and the Machine Age, in GEORGE

GERSHWIN 225, 225-229 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (noting the significance of
the machine age in influencing everything Gershwin did, from the arts to
finance, and the fact that composers have been helped by the mechanical
reproduction of music).
83

Richardson, supra note 74, at 170 (noting that Gershwin had a radio show

twice a week); EDWARD JABLONSKI, GERSHWIN 260-263, 276-277 (1998)
(noting that Gershwin had a radio show called “Music by Gershwin,” the first
series of which aired twice weekly for 15 minutes on Monday and Friday
evenings from February to May 1934, and a second series, a half-hour program
on Sunday night that ran from September to December 1934).
84

ALEC WILDER, THE AMERICAN POPULAR SONG: THE GREAT INNOVATORS,

1900-1950, at 122-123 (1990) (noting enormous exposure provided to Gershwin
by radio); Peyser, supra note 79, at 127, 130 (noting that the Gershwins founded
the New World Music Company, which published all Gershwin works, as a
subsidiary of T.B. Harms).
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songwriters who owned their own publishing businesses. Both Irving
Berlin and George Gershwin formed their own publishing businesses.85
Porgy and Bess, which premiered in New York City in 1935,86 depicts the
life of Porgy, Bess and other African American inhabitants of the fictional
Catfish Row near Charleston, South Carolina. Porgy and Bess was based
on the novel Porgy by DuBose Heyward,87 which Heyward’s wife
Dorothy transformed into a play that formed the basis of the Porgy and
Bess libretto.88 Heyward was born in South Carolina of an aristocratic
family.89 Lacking formal education, Heyward became a cotton checker on
the Charleston wharves, where he was exposed to African American
dockworkers and fisherman on whom he based his novel.90 Gershwin first
approached the Heywards in 1926, but did not actually compose Porgy
and Bess until after he signed a contract with the Heywards in October
1932.91
The collaboration of the Gershwins with the Heywards was an
acknowledged one in which all parties received copyright credit and
compensation. Such acknowledged collaborations, however, tell only one
part of the story of the creation of musical works such as Porgy and Bess.
Throughout his career, George Gershwin borrowed extensively from other
85

Peyser, supra note 79, at 130.

86

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Porgy and Bess opened in New

York in October 1935 in a Broadway theater and not an opera house and ran for 124
performances, which was not enough to recover the original investment).
87

Id. at 159.

88

Id.

89

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 252.

90

Id.

91

Id.
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musicians and other music, had numerous collaborators, many of whom
were not acknowledged, received no credit and were given no
compensation. The fact of these collaborations reflects the process of
creation of musical works and is by no means atypical. Rather, borrowing
is a norm in the creation of music that copyright law has not yet fully
confronted.92 How copyright structures interface with musical borrowing
is a complex question that touches upon broader societal concerns,
including hierarchies and the relative power and status of the sources from
which new creators draw both inspiration and material.
B.

Musical Borrowing and Porgy and Bess

As is often the case in the creation of music,93 Gershwin’s compositional
technique generally involved extensive collaboration and musical
borrowing, in his case particularly from African American sources.94 The
availability for uses in new works of existing works and styles was thus
crucial to the production of Gershwin’s music. Examining the processes
through which Gershwin created his music highlights the borrowing often
inherent in the composition process and the importance of composers
being able to draw upon prior works in creating new ones.
1.

Gershwin’s Technical Collaborations

In addition to collaborating with a number of lyricists, the most prominent

92

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.

93

Id. (discussing the pervasiveness of musical borrowing).

94

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ noting that Gershwin’s concert works draw

heavily on black American elements).
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of whom was his brother Ira,95 Gershwin relied extensively on the
technical assistance of musicians with a better theoretical grounding in
music.96 Gershwin typically did not give credit to these collaborators,97
who in some instances provided critical assistance in correcting technical
inadequacies in Gershwin’s works:
What made Kay especially valuable was that she had studied
counterpoint—the discipline that Gershwin lacked . . . She could
give George sound advice and notate the music he played, an
enormously time-saving service. Kay Swift did this not only with
his songs, but she helped transcribe the three piano preludes, which
were first performed in December 1926 and published the
following year . . . Gershwin had to have envied her superior
musical training.98
Although Gershwin had classical musical training and was considered to

95

Peyser, supra note 79, at 69 (noting that Ira became George’s full-time lyricist

in the mid-1920s). Following George’s death, Ira continued as a successful
lyricist, working with Kurt Weill and writing the lyrics for a number of films,
including A Star is Born. See Edward Jablonski, What about Ira? in THE
GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 255, 259,
272-273 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (noting Ira’s work on the lyrics of Weill’s
Lady in the Dark and the film A Star is Born).
96

Peyser, supra note 79, at 71, 120-121, 194 (noting that at various times,

Gershwin relied on Will Vodery, James P. Johnson, Kay Swift, Edward Kilenyi
and Bill Daly for orchestrations).
97

Id. at 104 (noting that Gershwin did not give credit to James P. Johnson for

Gershwin’s use of the Charleston rhythm originated by Johnson).
98

Id. at 120-121.
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be an excellent pianist,99 part of Gershwin’s technical limitations came
from the fact that he lacked formal training in music theory and
counterpoint, having largely ceased piano lessons with Charles Hambitzer
at age sixteen after he began working in Tin Pan Alley.100 Gershwin’s
piano style came from his experience making player piano rolls at the
beginning of his career and African American musicians he watched and
heard in Harlem.101 In the 1920s, Gershwin began to feel that his musical
ambitions and creativity were hindered by his lack of technical capacity.102
As a result, he studied music theory and counterpoint with other teachers,
including Edward Kilenyi, Henry Cowell and Joseph Schillinger,103 and
99

Charles Hamm, “It’s Only a Paper Moon”; or The Golden Years of Tin Pan

Alley, in YESTERDAYS: POPULAR SONG IN AMERICA 326, 346, 348 (1983)
(noting that Gershwin was an excellent pianist who had received a sound
classical training, a reliable technique and exposure to the music of Bach,
Beethoven, Liszt, Chopin, Ravel and Debussy from his piano teacher
Hambitzer).
100

Peyser, supra note 79, at 31 (noting that Gershwin stopped regular piano

lessons at sixteen).
101

Peyser, supra note 79, at 35 (“He got his piano style not only from the player

piano but also from the black musicians he watched and heard in Harlem.”);
New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin began
working for Jerome H. Remick & Co., a music publishing firm on Tin Pan
Alley, as a song plugger for $15 per week); Hamm, supra note 99, at 346
(noting that Gershwin cut some 125 piano rolls after 1915).
102

WILLIAM G. HYLAND, GEORGE GERSHWIN: A NEW BIOGRAPHY 167 (2003).

103

Peyser, supra note 79, at 158 (noting Gershwin studies with Cowell, who

may have sent Gershwin to study with Schillinger); Richardson, supra note 74,
at 164 (noting harmonization, orchestration and form studies with Kilenyi); New
Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin studied with a
succession of teachers, including Rubin Goldmark, Riegger and Cowell).
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unsuccessfully solicited instruction from the composers Maurice Ravel
and Arnold Schoenberg.104 His progression from a background in popular
music practice and immersion in African American musical traditions
prior to becoming a more “serious” composer influenced his musical
production.105
2.

Gershwin’s Borrowings of Music and Musical Style

Popular song from the 1920s to 1950s was far closer to classical music
than African American music and African American musical elements
104

Charlotte Greenspan, Rhapsody in Blue: A Study in Hollywood Hagiography,

in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN
145, 150 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (noting that Gershwin solicited
instruction from Ravel and Schoenberg, both of whom assured Gershwin that he
did not need lessons from them).
105

See Richard Crawford, It Ain’t Necessarily Soul: Gershwin’s ‘Porgy and

Bess as a Symbol, 8 YB INTER-AM. MUSICAL RES. 17, 19-20 (1972) (noting that
Gershwin’s career as a “serious” composer “was launched by the Aeolian Hall
concert” of Rhapsody in Blue, which reflected his study of “aspects of serious
composition with private teachers” and Gershwin’s solidifying of ties with
“serious” music at the same time as he continued to prosper on Broadway);
Hamm, supra note 99, at 348 (noting that Gershwin was distinguished from
other Tin Pan Alley songwriters by his involvement in classical music and jazz);
CHRISTOPHER SMALL, MUSIC OF THE COMMON TONGUE: SURVIVAL AND
CELEBRATION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSIC 350 (1987) (“George Gershwin is
a different case altogether, for despite the classical training which he underwent
in common with many of the other ‘Broadway masters’ of the time, he came as a
practicing musician to classical composition only after considerable experience
in Afro-American music; the small number of concert pieces he created before
his premature death in 1937, and especially his opera Porgy and Bess, give a
hint of a genuinely popular concert and theatre music, of a kind that Mozart
would have understood.”).
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were for the most part assimilated through ragtime, blues, African
American Broadway musicals and jazz.106 In addition to Porgy and Bess,
Gershwin composed many pieces of music that reflect significant musical
influence and borrowing from various sources, particularly African
American cultural forms. George Gershwin was thus unusual in the extent
of his reliance on such musical forms.107 His song I Got Rhythm, for
example, “was full of the accents of ragtime and, to a lesser extent,
blues.”108 The emphasis on ragtime in I Got Rhythm reflects the fact that
by the time of Gershwin’s birth, the U.S. was captivated by ragtime
music.109 Gershwin also actively sought out the opportunity to hear
African American performers, both closer to home in Harlem during the
artistic flowering that formed the Harlem Renaissance, as well as in South
Carolina, where he spent time observing Gullah communities in the South
Sea Islands during the time that he composed Porgy and Bess.110 In
106

Small, supra note 105, at 277 (“Musically, the popular song from the 1920s

to the 1950s was much closer to classical music than to black music. Black
elements, which, as we have seen, were absorbed in the terms of this century
from ragtime and from blues as well as through the black Broadway musicals,
were now also assimilated through jazz, but they remained what they had always
been – a gloss on what were essentially European closed forms”).
107

Hamm, supra note 99, at 352 (noting that African American music struck a

deep responsive chord in Gershwin).
108

Small, supra note 105, at 277; [hip hop sources]

109

Peyser, supra note 79, at 38.

110

See David Horn, From Catfish Row to Granby Street: Contesting Meaning in

Porgy and Bess, 13 POP. MUSIC 165, 166 (1994) (noting that Gershwin
holidayed in the Sea Islands and Charleston, observed Gullah folk traditions and
attended church services where he joined in shouts and heard the calls of street
vendors); DuBose Heyward, Porgy and Bess Return on the Wings of Song, in
GEORGE GERSHWIN 34, 39 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (discussing George
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consciously seeking out African American music, Gershwin was
“schooled and indoctrinated in the African-American musical cauldron
that was the Harlem Renaissance”111 and was profoundly influenced by
African American music from his adolescence.112 Gershwin’s music
emphasized blue notes typically associated with jazz.113 In Rhapsody in
Blue, for example, “the inventive rhythms, the swinging touch that came
directly from jazz, brought a quality to the classical-music world that was

Gershwin’s stay in 1934 on Folly Island, a barrier island 10 miles from
Charleston).
111

SAMUEL A. FLOYD, JR., THE POWER OF BLACK MUSIC: INTERPRETING ITS

HISTORY FROM AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES 165 (1995) (citations omitted);
see also Peyser, supra note 79, at 36 (“’George Gershwin was certainly one of
the earliest [white songwriters] to seek out black music purely from personal
interest. He soaked himself in it.’”); Catherine Parsons Smith, From William
Grant Still: A Study in Contradictions, in THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER, 147,
150 (“Gershwin was well known to seek out performances by black
musicians”); Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (“It should also be noted that Gershwin,
more than any other composer (or critic, or historian) of his time, constantly
sought out black musicians and listened to the widest possible range of black
music.”).
112

Peyser, supra note 79, at 36; Floyd, supra note 111, at 165 (“Beginning in the

early 1920s, George Gershwin composed music influenced by and based on
black musical devices and traits, including the opera Blue Monday Blues (1922),
the concerto Rhapsody in Blue (1924), and the orchestral tone poem An
American in Paris (1928).”).
113

Peyser, supra note 79, at 69 (noting that Gershwin emphasized blue notes or

intervals of flat thirds and sevenths); Wilder, supra note 84, at 19 (“Long before
George Gershwin began toying with them, the flatted seventh and flatted third of
the scale were conventional elements of the blues.”).
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perceived as genuine freshness.”114 The popularity of Rhapsody in Blue,
composed in 1924, “inspired Gershwin to make extensive study of the
idioms and characteristics of American folklore.”115
Gershwin borrowed the piano style of Luckey Roberts, a prominent
African American pianist in New York City prior to World War I.116
From Roberts, Gershwin learned drive and syncopation that was at that
time unknown to most white piano players.117 Judith Anne Still, the
daughter of William Grant Still, a classically trained African American
composer, has alleged that Gershwin’s piece I Got Rhythm was stolen
from her father.118 At a minimum, Gershwin ingested and borrowed
significantly from African American musical styles and musicians.119
Further, Gershwin’s talent in playing the piano and style of playing that
was largely unheard outside of African American musical circles, “gave
him entry into a more elevated stratum of society than he could have
entered without it.”120
114

Peyser, supra note 79, at 84; New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___

(“The musical juxtapositions of Rhapsody in Blue had roots in a sensibility that
never fully accepted a separation between popular and classical genres.”).
115

J. Rosamond Johnson, Emancipator of American Idioms, in GEORGE

GERSHWIN 65, 66 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938).
116

Peyser, supra note 79, at 40-41.

117

Id. at 41 (noting that Robert’s trademark was “a left hand of dazzling speed

and an idiosyncratic way of playing tremolo with the right.”).
118

Id. at 43-44 (noting “the very real sense of rage that many blacks continue to feel

because they believe a language that was once theirs was expropriated from them and
exploited by whites”).
119

Id. at 41 (“Gershwin appropriated this from the blacks, ingested it until it was

his own, and transformed it into his songs.”).
120

Id. at 42.
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Gershwin’s composition practice was based borrowing and reflected a
“synthesis” of elements derived from a variety of stylistic sources.
Gershwin found inspiration in African American blues and jazz
styles, Tin Pan Alley idioms, and the languages and forms of
European art music. He achieved his synthesis through the
identification and structural exploitation of musical characteristics
shared among these diverse traditions. One example of this is the
extensive use he made in Porgy and Bess of the relationships that
can be developed between “blue” thirds (of the type found in blues
and jazz music) and the kind of modal mixture and harmonic
complexity associated with late Romantic tonal harmony.121
3.

Musical Borrowing, Musical Collaboration and Porgy and
Bess

Gershwin’s use of borrowing in his compositional practice was also
reflected in Porgy and Bess. In fact, Gershwin’s first opera, Blue Monday
Blues (1922),122 which used African American musical devices and traits,
foreshadowed Porgy and Bess.123 During the process of composing Porgy
and Bess, Gershwin worked closely with the Heywards and his brother Ira,
who received credit writing the lyrics for some of the songs from the

121

Starr, Art Music, supra note 80, at 170-171 (citations omitted).

122

Floyd, supra note 111, at 165 (noting African American musical devices and

traits in Gershwin’s music).
123

See Hyland, supra note 102, at 158-159.
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opera,124 while DuBose Heyward received credit for the lyrics of others.125
Both Gershwin and Heyward were interested in creating an authentic folk
opera, which resulted in a treatment of African American life that was
highly unusual in their day in the “serious” music arena.126 Also atypical
was the reliance of Porgy and Bess on an African American cast,127 a
decision that was reached after considering having Porgy portrayed by Al
Jolson in blackface.128 The original Porgy and Bess was drawn largely
from African American classical singers for whom the opportunity to sing
classical music in front of white audiences was for the most part new.129

124

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 263-272 (noting that Ira’s sophisticated

songwriting style was particularly suited to songs performed by the character
Sporting Life, a Harlem gambler who drifted into Catfish Row).
125

Hyland, supra note 102, at 164 (noting that George set many Heyward lyrics,

including “I Got Plenty of Nuttin’ and “Summertime” to music with few
changes).
126

Hyland, supra note 102, at 163 (noting the incongruities of “a Russian Jew

from the Lower East Side and a white southern aristocrat collaborating to write
an opera about life in the Negro quarter of Charleston, South Carolina.”).
127

Peyser, supra note 96, at 229-230 (noting reliance African American cast by

one earlier “serious” musical work: the Virgil Thomson’s opera Four Saints in
Three Acts).
128

Hyland, supra note 102, at 255-258 (noting that Al Jolson actively pursued

the role of Porgy but was unable to find time to undertake the role and that
Heyward was initially opposed but soon became resigned to Jolson’s portraying
Porgy).
129

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 280-283 (noting that a number of members of the

cast were students and graduates of the Juilliard school and other conservatories
who had previously performed in black versions of classical operas and that one
singer, Edward Matthews, had performed in Thompson’s Four Saints in Three
Acts).
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As he composed Porgy and Bess, Gershwin spent time in Gullah
communities in and around Charleston, South Carolina. 130 Gullah
communities are rich in cultural traditions and also retain a significant
number of Africanisms in cultural expression, including language and
music;131 they thus represented a rich resource from which Gershwin
could draw. During his stay South Carolina, Gershwin had the
opportunity to hear spirituals in churches in the area.132 The music he
heard in South Carolina shaped Gershwin’s treatment of the storm scene
in Porgy and Bess, which involves the intertwining of six individual
prayers that culminates in a traditional spiritual sung in harmony by the
chorus.133 In addition to borrowing generally from African American
musical styles and works, Porgy and Bess incorporates the spiritual
“Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child” in the aria “Summertime.”134

130

Hyland, supra note 102, at 160 (noting that DuBose Heyward’s mother,

Janie, was an expert in Gullah culture and dialect); Jablonski, supra note 83, at
272-276 (discussing Gershwin stay at Folly Island).
131

See Lorenzo D. Turner, Problems Confronting the Investigation of Gullah, in

MOTHERWIT FROM THE LAUGHING BARREL: READINGS IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF AFRO-AMERICAN FOLKLORE

126-140 (Alan Dundes ed., 1973) (discussing

parallels between Gullah and West African languages); Janie Gilliard Moore,
Africanisms Among Blacks of the Sea Islands, 10 J. BLACK STUDIES 467, ___
(1980).
132

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 274 (noting that Gershwin learned a lot of

spirituals by going to churches around the area).
133

Id. at 276 (noting that Gershwin re-created the effect he heard in the churches

he visited in the storm scene in Act II, Scene 4).
134

Floyd, supra note 111, at 218 (noting that Summertime involves extended

troping of this tune, including with respect to the intervallic structure of minor
and major thirds and major seconds, the rhythm of the spiritual, the spiritual’s
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Both “Summertime” and “Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child” also
follow the same harmonic scheme.135
Gershwin may have borrowed from other sources as well. Schillinger,
Gershwin’s music theory teacher, later alleged that he was a major
contributor to Porgy and Bess.136 Although Schillinger’s contributions to
Porgy and Bess are not substantiated,137 some of Gershwin’s prior works,
including Variations on I Got Rhythm and Cuban Overtures, “owed a lot
to Schillinger.”138 Some passages from Porgy and Bess appear to some

melodic and rhythmic structures as well as beat); Samuel A. Floyd, Jr. Troping
the Blues: From Spirituals to the Concert Hall, 13 BLACK MUSIC RES. 31, 37-42
(1993) (discussing Gershwin’s troping of “Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless
Child” as the first extended troping of the song and describing “Summertime” as
a “masterful revision of the old spiritual”).
135

Floyd, supra note 111, at 218.

136

Hyland, supra note 102, at 167 (noting that Schillinger following Gershwin’s

death alleged that he had contributed to Porgy and Bess, an assertion rebutted
vehemently by Ira Gershwin).
137

Id.

138

Id.; see also Vernon Duke (Dukelsky), Gershwin, Schillinger, and Dukelsky,

75 MUSICAL Q. 119 (discussing the relationship between Gershwin, Schillinger
and the author, who completed Gershwin’s songs for the film Goldwyn Follies
following Gershwin’s death); Peyser, supra note 79, at 300 (noting that Ira
Gershwin completed the songs for Goldwyn Follies with Duke following George
Gershwin’s death); Paul Nauert, Theory and Practice in “Porgy and Bess”: The
Gershwin-Schillinger Connection, 78 MUSICAL Q. 9, 12 (1994) (noting that
Gershwin took 4 1/5 hours of lessons a week for the first year or two of his
lessons with Schillinger and that Schillinger’s influence on this music is hotly
debated).
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commentators to show signs of Schillinger’s influence.139 At a minimum,
Gershwin’s orchestrations improved significantly as a result of his lessons
with Schillinger.140
4.

Borrowings and the Reception of Porgy and Bess

The general tendency of Gershwin to borrow from African American
cultural expression has significantly influenced responses to Porgy and
Bess.141 The critical response to Porgy and Bess has tended to be
influenced by the sources of Gershwin’s borrowings, which prior to the
1970s led to Gershwin not being accorded the status of a “serious”
composer.142 The reception of Porgy and Bess has been guided by the
complexities of the work as “an opera, as folklore, as racial stereotype,
and as cultural exploitation.”143
139

See Nauert, supra note 138, at 14 (“A few passages from the opera have

struck commentators as showing the clearest signs of Schillinger’s influence.
These include the “fugue” that accompanies the crap game in act 1, scene 2, and
returns, expanded, during Crown’s murder in act 3, scene 1; the storm/hurricane
music; the choral background in ‘Gone, Gone, Gone’”) (citations omitted).
140

Id. at 12 (noting that “virtually all agree that his orchestrations improved

significantly thanks to Schillinger”).
141

Crawford, supra note 105, at 24-32 (distinguishing the reaction to Porgy and

Bess from four perspectives: as an American opera, as American folklore, as
racial stereotype and as cultural exploitation).
142

See infra notes 161 to 185 and accompanying text.

143

Richardson, supra note 74, at 169 (noting complexities of Porgy and Bess

“and the fact that the opera was ‘not only written, but produced, directed and
staged by whites, which means that whites reaped the monetary profits of its
success’”); Crawford, supra note 105, at 23 (noting the complexities of Porgy
and Bess as a work of “serious” art depicting African Americans in the South
are reflected in Gershwin’s distance from the authenticity of the original
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Although Porgy and Bess did receive laudatory reviews during its run in
Boston,144 critical reviews of Porgy and Bess were at best mixed during
Gershwin’s lifetime.145 The initial New York run was not successful
commercially and closed with losses.146 The Gershwin family has
permitted extensive musical revisions of Porgy and Bess since the time of
George Gershwin’s death. For example, the revival of Porgy and Bess
from 1941 to 1944 was a popular but extensively modified version from
the one that premiered in New York in 1935.147 The version of Porgy and
Bess presented to audiences prior to the 1970s, however, was one based on
cuts made by Gershwin after the Boston run and prior to the New York
world premiere of the opera.148 By the late 1970s, musicologists and
material and the act of two white men manipulating the imagery of African
American culture for their own purposes).
144

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 288 (noting success of the Boston run).

145

Peyser, supra note 79, at 248 (noting that New York reviewers reacted

negatively to the cuts made by Gershwin in the opera); Jablonski, supra note 83,
at 89 (noting that dramatic critics tended to like the production while music
critics did not).
146

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 89 (noting that the run closed after 124

performances in New York); Stanley Green, Oklahoma!: Its Origin and
Influence, 2 AM. MUSIC 88, 89 (1984) (noting that Porgy and Bess was not
initially a financial success); Wilder, supra note 84, at 155 (noting that Porgy
and Bess “lost a good deal of money, and, in general, the opera critics dismissed
it”).
147

See Charles Hamm, The Theatre Guild Production of “Porgy and Bess”, 40

J. AM. MUSICOLOGICAL SOC’Y 495, 497 (1986) (noting the popularity of the
Cheryl Crawford revival, which reduced the cast and chorus by half and the
orchestra from 44 to 27 pieces).
148

See Peyser, supra note 79, at 246-248 (noting cuts made by Gershwin prior to

the New York premiere); Hamm, supra note 73, at 11 (noting that all versions of
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critics had begun to reevaluate Porgy and Bess,149 which received the
imprimatur of the Metropolitan Opera, which performed a version of
Porgy and Bess in 1985, fifty years after its premiere.150
In contrast to the general critical response, which has focused on the status
of Porgy and Bess as a work of art, African American commentary has
tended to look at the representations of African American culture within
Porgy and Bess.151 The African American critical response to Porgy and
Bess has been mixed. Many performers of Porgy and Bess, including
William Warfield, have been supportive of the work.152 Others, including
Duke Ellington and journalist James Hicks, reacted negatively to the
African American characterizations in Porgy and Bess.153
5.

The Shape of the Public Domain: Determining the Scope
of Common Pool Resources

Like many others, Gershwin borrowed extensively from African American

Porgy and Bess are problematic and that even the Houston Grand Opera
Company and Metropolitan opera version are based on a score that was
complete six months before the first performance and thus likely not an accurate
reflection of Gershwin’s intent since revisions made and approved by him may
not have been incorporated in this score).
149

See Hyland, supra note 102, at 176-177.

150

Id. at 177; see also “Porgy and Bess: An American Voice (PBS ____), at

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/gperf/porgy/index.html).
151

See Horn, supra note 110, at 168 (noting that the debate about aesthetic merit

and representations of African Americans came into direct contact in a debate in
Liverpool, England relating to a proposed production of Porgy and Bess).
152

Id. at 173-174.

153

Id.
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cultural expression. As has been true in other cases, borrowings from
African American traditions and artists have often taken place within the
context of copyright frameworks that have historically facilitated the use
without compensation of cultural forms that fall in a lower place in
sociocultural hierarchies.154 As a result, certain types of cultural
expression may be treated as a public domain resource available to all, as
is often the case, for instance, with local knowledge in the context of
global intellectual property regimes today.155
In some cases, a tendency to designate particular forms of cultural
expression a public domain resource may be a result of the fact that the
source may truly reflect a common pool of resources from which many
draw inspiration and material. In such cases, payment of compensation
for use of such material is often not feasible and likely not desirable, since
common pool resources are commons that should be generally available to
all. Although compensation may not be feasible or desired in such cases,
attribution to the source of the material would probably be beneficial. In
addition, when public domain resources are embedded within copyrighted
works, care should be taken to ensure that copyright protection does
eliminate future access to the public domain elements within the
copyrighted work. Preventing access to such elements could effectively
prevent future uses of such public domain material for the duration of

154

See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2; see also infra notes 168 to 176 and

accompanying text.
155

See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Romance of the Public

Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (discussing conceptions of the public
domain); Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2.
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copyright protection.156
In contrast to uses of public domain resources, in other cases, certain types
of cultural expression may be treated as a common pool resource as a
result of hierarchies of culture, power and taste.157 Such hierarchies are
often expressed through and reflected in the operation of copyright law
structures, which may facilitate the borrowing without compensation of
cultural expression of certain often disempowered individuals or
groups.158 The uses of African American cultural expression without
compensation during the twentieth century have, in some instances,
reflected the existence and operation of such hierarchies with respect to
copyright law and its application. Such uses have included borrowings by
composers such as Gershwin as well as others, including rock and roll
musicians, who frequently borrowed from the blues tradition and blues
artists.159

156

See infra note 274 and accompanying text.

157

Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2.

158

Id.

159

See Dixon v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15291(1985)

(involving suit by blues artist Willie Dixon against the rock group Led Zeppelin,
alleging that Led Zeppelin’s song Whole Lotta Love constituted copyright
infringement of Dixon’s song I Need Love); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 2, at
117-148 (discussing copyright and African American music); Hall, supra note 2,
at 31-51; Greene, supra note 2, at 357-358 (“Music scholars have noted that
Black artists, as a class of performers, routinely found their works appropriated
and exploited by publishers and managers. The publishers typically (although
hardly always) were white. As a result, Black artists as a class were denied the
economic benefits of the copyright system.”) (citations omitted); see also
Arewa, Elvis, supra note 7.
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Gershwin borrowed both from common pool resources that may be
considered public domain as well as knowledge that, although treated as a
public domain resource, was likely not a public domain resource and for
which compensation could and in some instances perhaps should have
been paid. Both types of borrowings are potentially problematic in light
of the current aggregation of control and compensation within copyright
law frameworks, which may enable users of public domain resources or
other existing works to use copyright protection to prevent similar uses of
their works. In addition to being highly inequitable, this outcome is
particularly ironic with respect to Gershwin’s works including Porgy and
Bess, which contains depictions of African Americans and African
American culture that were questioned and criticized by even the
standards of the time of its creation on account of the characterizations it
included. Porgy and Bess is also a popular and widespread work and one
of the few representations of African American culture in the “high”
culture music sphere. Gershwin family restrictions on uses of Porgy and
Bess substantially affects cultural meaning in preventing any
reinterpretation of this work, which now represents a seminal “high”
culture depiction of African Americans and African American culture.160
C.

Hierarchies of Cultural Forms and Gershwin’s Works
1.

Porgy and Bess as “Serious” Art

Although Porgy and Bess has since its creation leapt from the world of
popular art to high culture,161 the initial response to the opera was rooted

160

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.

161

See Hyland, supra note 102, at 178.
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in pervasive hierarchies of cultural forms.162 Part of the reaction to Porgy
and Bess and other Gershwin works after the concerto Rhapsody in Blue
came from the fact that they were difficult to classify within existing
hierarchies as popular music given their technical attributes.163 At the
same time, such works did not fit within accepted characterizations of
“serious” music on account of their being based in vernacular cultural
forms including those coming from African American traditions.164
From the nineteenth century onwards, rankings of aesthetic value of
musical works, or what might be termed hierarchies of taste, have been
characteristic of evaluations of musical production and have significantly
influenced the development of copyright frameworks.165 George
Gershwin’s background and image
162

See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing the role of hierarchies of cultural

forms in music and other expressive arts).
163

See Crawford, supra note 105, at 23 (noting that Porgy and Bess is a

paradoxical work of “opera interlaced with hit songs”); Richard Crawford,
Gershwin’s Reputation: A Note on Porgy and Bess, 65 MUSICAL Q. 257, 257258 (1979) (noting that scholars are uneasy about Gershwin because his music is
difficult to classify); Carol Oja, Gershwin and American Modernism, 78
MUSICAL Q. 122, 122 (1994) (noting that Gershwin straddled the divide between
high and low culture forms); Starr, supra note 81, at 429-430 (noting that
Gershwin’s “free embrace of influences from popular idioms resulted in music
with a more conservative harmonic and rhythmic surface than that typical of
contemporaneous ‘avant-garde’ works” and was also a stumbling block toward
his music being taken “seriously”).
164

See Crawford, supra note 105, at 19 (noting that Rhapsody in Blue was

Gershwin’s “first unclassifiable act as a musician”).
165

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing hierarchies of taste in hip hop

music); Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing hierarchies of culture and
hierarchies of taste with respect to music in the nineteenth century).
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played out the generalizations that established guardians of
American high culture found so disturbing. He grew up as part of
a Jewish working-class America, straddling volatile racial lines.166
As a result of his background and musical choices in the context of such
hierarchies, Gershwin was “regarded either as an outsider or, once
“inside,” as associated with ‘lower’ art.”167
2.

Insider and Outsider Status, Hierarchies and Copyright

Gershwin’s simultaneous insider and outsider status meant that he both
benefited from and suffered as a result of hierarchies of culture. George
Gershwin benefited immensely from the existence of such hierarchies. As
a white composer whose work involved extensive borrowing from African
American cultural forms, Gershwin was able to present musical forms
derived from that tradition in ways not then available to African American
artists who worked in those idioms.168 Such music, coming from outside
of the classical tradition, seemed fresh and inventive to those who heard it,
many of whom were not well acquainted with the context from which such
music derived. In addition, hierarchies affected Gershwin’s ability to
borrow from African American sources without compensation. This
ability to borrow reflected the fact that African American cultural
traditions have been for the most part treated as part of the public

166

Richardson, supra note 83, at 167.

167

Id.

168

Small, supra note 105, at 331-332 (noting that Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue

was commissioned by Paul Whiteman, the “self-styled ‘King of Jazz’” as part of
Whiteman’s effort to make jazz respectable and accessible to white Americans).
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domain.169 This categorization as a public domain resource enabled
Gershwin and others to borrow liberally from African American sources
during much of the twentieth century. The public domain categorization
also meant that such borrowings were not deemed copyright infringement,
highlighting the intimate relationship between the scope of copyright
protection, power and status.170
At the same time, Gershwin also suffered from hierarchies of taste on
account of being Jewish, lacking formal musical training and his
connection with popular and non-European musical forms.171
Opportunities for Jewish composers were restricted in the serious music
realm in Gershwin’s time.172 In addition, a pervasive anti-Semitism is
evident in some commentary about Gershwin’s music,173 including
169

See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing borrowings from African

American traditions).
170

Id. (discussing rock and roll borrowings from the blues tradition); see also

HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL __ (1984)
(discussing Porgy and Bess as a paradigm case of the lack of control of African
Americans over their artistic and cultural destiny); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra
note 2, at 117-148 (discussing copyright and African American music); Hall,
supra note 2, at 39-40 (discussing the systematic appropriation of African
American musical forms; Greene, supra note 2, at 357-358 (commenting on use
of copyright to appropriate African American music).
171

See supra notes 122 to 151 and accompanying text.

172

Peyser, supra note 79, at 222-223 (noting that the 1920s was “the first decade

in the history of Western music that Jews excluding these converts were even
allowed to try to enter the exalted field of concert repertoire”); Richardson,
supra note 74, at 167 (noting Gershwin’s image as part of a Jewish, workingclass, immigrant family who straddled racial lines).
173

Peyser, supra note 79, at 237-239.
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composer Virgil Thomson’s review of Porgy and Bess, which referred to
“gefilte fish orchestration.”174 Further, Gershwin’s family came to the
United States from Russia, which meant that he fell in a lower place in
social and cultural hierarchies than Jewish composers from Austrian and
German backgrounds such as Arnold Schoenberg,175 or American Jewish
composers such as Aaron Copland, who had studied extensively in
Europe.176
3.

Gershwin’s Musical Training, Experience and Commercial
Success

Gershwin’s music was also denigrated because of his lack of formal
training in classical theory, particularly counterpoint and orchestration,
and commercial success.177 Gershwin did attempt throughout his life to
rectify his formal musical deficiencies through studies with teachers such
as Joseph Schillinger.178 Gershwin also relied on others throughout his

174

Id. at 248 (noting the smarmy anti-Semitism in Thompson’s remarks).

175

Id. at 33 (noting that prior to 1915, only German and Austrian Jewish

composers such as Mendelssohn, Mahler and Schoenberg had established
successful careers as composers, and that these composers were highly educated,
assimilated men who had formally converted to other religions)
176

Id. at 97-99 (noting that Copland became identified as the dean of American

music despite the far greater popularity and public consciousness of Gershwin’s
works); Starr, Art Music, supra note 80, at 180 (noting Copland studies in Paris
with Nadia Boulanger, where “Copland quickly absorbed important elements of
contemporary European musical styles”).
177

Peyser, supra note 79, at 57 (discussing gaps in Gershwin’s technical music

training).
178

Id. at 197-198.
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career to do his orchestrations and assist with notation.179
Gershwin started his musical career at age fifteen,180 first as a pianist and
later as a piano roll player in Tin Pan Alley in New York City.181 Later in
his career, as he attempted to move into the realm of serious composition
within the classical music idiom, Gershwin’s connection with Tin Pan
Alley, then the center of popular music production globally,182 continued
to taint his work in the views of classical music critics of the time.183 In
addition, Gershwin’s syncretic style, which derived much inspiration and
borrowing from African American and other traditions outside of the
mainstream European classical tradition, including Jewish scales and
179

Id. at 71 (noting that Will Vodery, an African American friend and colleague

of Gershwin, orchestrated Gershwin’s short opera Blue Monday Blues); see
supra notes 95 to 105 and accompanying text.
180

See Ira Gershwin, My Brother, in GEORGE GERSHWIN 16, 17 (Merle

Armitage ed., 1938) (noting that George became a piano pounder in Tin Pan
Alley at age 15 for $15 a week (approximately $287 in 2004 dollars)).
181

Id. at 31, 33.

182

Charles Hamm, “After the Ball”; or The Birth of Tin Pan Alley, in

YESTERDAYS: POPULAR SONG IN AMERICA 284, 285-286 (1983) (discussing
birth of Tin Pan Alley in New York City in 1880s, which by 1900 controlled the
popular song industry).
183

See THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER, supra note 73, at xi (noting that

Gershwin was “[l]ambasted by critics for a lack of formal compositional
techniques”); Larry Starr, Musings on “Nice Gershwin Tunes,” Form, and
Harmony in the Concert Music of Gershwin, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW
LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 95, 95 (Wayne Schneider ed.,
1999) (“But from the first reviews of Rhapsody in Blue through the early
criticism of Porgy and Bess and up to the present day, connoisseurs and
sophisticates, authorities and would-be authorities on Gershwin have claimed
that he simply lacked the technique to construct convincing large-scale works.”).
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motifs, was also often dismissed because of its connection with such
forms.184
In the last years of his life from 1932 to 1937, Gershwin was subjected to
enormous criticism as he attempted to become a more serious composer.
Gershwin’s enormous commercial success was a continuing hurdle to his
ambitions since his experience also ran counter to notions that great
musicians should suffer from deprivation.185 Gershwin’s commercial
success was both partly attributable to and reinforced by his uses of
copyright.
III.
A.

THE GERSHWINS, CONTROL AND THE USES OF COPYRIGHT

George Gershwin and the Uses of Copyright

George Gershwin actively participated in technological transformations in
music practice and performance associated with the advent of the
recording industry and radio,186 which were in turn connected to the
decline in power of music publishers.187 In addition to writing songs for
184

Id. at 97 (“Music in New York in the 1920s was still very much a European

property . . . [v]irtually anyone who wanted to pursue serious music went abroad
to study”).
185

Peyser, supra note 96, at 214-215 (noting the publications of the League of

Composers rarely referred to Gershwin in other than a pejorative fashion, partly
because he was so popular).
186

See Hamm, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that Gershwin was “the first

American composer whose early career was built largely on the success of sales
of phonograph records of his songs”).
187

See Reebee Garofalo, From Music Publishing to MP3: Music and Industry in

the Twentieth Century, 17 AM. MUSIC 318, 336 (1999) (noting that records
becoming a staple of radio programming was the basis of records displacing live
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Tin Pan Alley and Broadway musicals, Gershwin also wrote songs for a
number of Hollywood films.188 Gershwin’s involvement in popular and
commercial music likely made him more conscious of the value of
copyrights. In fact, Gershwin’s uses of copyright anticipated twentiethcentury “popular music figures in his dealings with a new and
immediately complicated music business that embraced both
technology—whether in print, recording, or film—and attendant legalities,
such as royalties.”189 As a result, in addition to forming his own music
publishing company,190 he “always insisted on receiving a full 50%
interest in a composition, even when two lyric writers contributed to the
song, each lyric writer in such an instance sharing the other 50% interest
equally.”191 In other instances, it has been asserted that George and Ira
Gershwin replaced Ira when Ira was not available with a lyricist who
would be more accommodating and who would permit Ira to retain all
rights.192

performers in radio broadcasting and record companies’ displacing publishing
house as a power center).
188

Peyser, supra note 96, at 180-181, 258-290 (noting that George and Ira

Gershwin relocated to California in August 1936 to write songs for Hollywood
movies).
189

Richardson, supra note 74, at 169.

190

Peyser, supra note 96, at 127 (noting that George and Ira formed the New

World Music Company, which published all Gershwin works with profits going
two-thirds to George and one-third to Ira, as a subsidiary of T.B. Harms).
191

AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 431 (3d. ed., 2002).

192

Peyser, supra note 96, at 123 (noting that Howard Dietz claims that the

Gershwins selected him rather than P.G. Wodehouse to fill in for Ira when Ira
had an appendectomy and was unavailable for six weeks because he would be

Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Copyright on Catfish Row
B.

59

The Role of Artistic Legacies as Business: Control of the PostMortem George Gershwin Artistic Legacy

The Gershwin family has exerted significant control over Gershwin’s
musical legacy and image since his death.193 Moreover, with one
exception, all Gershwin biographers have had close ties to members of the
Gershwin family.194 A focus on control has been an integral part of
Gershwin family management of George Gershwin’s estate, particularly
with respect to copyrights, permissions and royalties. The Gershwin
family’s actions with respect to George’s legacy reflect the post-mortem
development of industries connected to popular figures that thrive and find
new life even in the death of the figures upon which they are based.195
The legacies of famous artists may be even more valuable after death than
they were during the artist’s lifetime,196 which has important implications
for copyright. Since copyright terms were originally much more limited in
duration,197 the role of heirs and other legal successors following the death
of copyright holders was not typically as pertinent an issue. Today,
however, with copyright extending for a generation after the death of
more accommodating than Wodehouse about rights and would permit Ira to
retain all the credit and money).
193

See Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (noting that understanding of Gershwin’s

music has been hindered by family intervention after his death).
194

Id. at 8.

195

See David Wall, Reconstructing the Soul of Elvis: The Social Development

and Legal Maintenance of Elvis Presley as Intellectual Property, 24 INT’L J.
SOCIOLOGY L. 117, 119 (1996) (noting the development of the Elvis industry
within hours of his death).
196

Id.

197

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95, 200 (discussing duration of prior copyright

statutes).
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creators, the role of copyright holder legacies as a business is increasingly
visible and important. The tension between artistic practice and artistic
legacy is by no means limited to deceased creators.198 Death, however,
ends the artistic practice side of the equation and tends to remove the
artistic legacy from its origin in the artistic practice that originally
generated the legacy.199 Artistic legacy is an intangible that may also be
protected by the right of publicity.200 The role of right of publicity with
respect to artistic legacy was raised in the case Gershwin v. The Whole
Thing Co.,201 which related to an unauthorized stage performance of music
by the George and Ira Gershwin.202
Further, as has been the case with the post-mortem Elvis empire,203 the
reified images of creators promoted by artistic legacy businesses is at
times in tension with the creators themselves, whose “artistry and
198

Id. at 120 (discussing contradiction in the artistic activities of the Rolling

Stones who strive to create new material but whose audience demand old songs
that are identified with the image of the group 30 years ago).
199

Id. (“In the long term, death or dissolution of partnership or artistry has the

effect of rarefying the artist and alienates the abstract image from its physical
origin, it also encourages reification.”).
200

Id. at 122, 124-133 (discussing the right of publicity in Elvis cases); Arewa,

Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (discussing implications of intangibles for
strategic behavior).
201

1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *12 (C.D. Cal., 1980) (discussing grand

rights and finding that a producer would need grand rights to the extent that a
performance tells a story or is “performed with dialogue, scenery, or costumes”).
202

Id. at *3 (noting that Ira Gershwin alleged in a suit that license was needed

because “the music publishers did not possess sufficient rights of copyright for
the dramatic live stage production of ‘Let's Call the Whole Thing Gershwin’ and
because Mr. Gershwin's rights of publicity would be invaded”).
203

Wall, supra note 195.
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ambitions often cause them to develop their artform in directions different
to those which made them popular.”204 This tension was particular evident
in Gershwin’s case in the last years of his life as he strove to develop his
music in a direction that diverged significantly from the work that made
him so popular.
As is the case with other business interests, controllers of copyright artistic
legacies actively advance their strategic interests to a great extent by the
same means as businesses do more generally. Consequently, such holders
are typically less connected to acts of creation than was the case during the
life of the creator. This dynamic is evident in the Gershwin case in the
activities of the Gershwin family, who has played a significant role in
shaping depictions of George Gershwin and his music following his
death.205 In the case of the Gershwins, maintaining respect for the
Gershwin image and music has been a key priority in controlling uses of
Gershwin copyrights.206
The business activities of cultural legacies have significant implications
for copyright by virtue of the sources from which such legacies derive
value. Such sources of value are often not adequately contemplated in
existing copyright discourse. As a result, understanding the business
structure and operation of artistic legacies is important for understanding
how such legacies interact with copyright frameworks today.
204

Id. at 119-120.

205

Peyser, supra note 79, at 86 (noting that Ira Gershwin and his wife Leonore,

jealously guarded his position during George’s lifetime and in the manipulation
of history after his death).
206

See Gershwin v. Whole Thing, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *5 (“Mr.

[Ira] Gershwin has always endeavored to preserve the public respect for the
Gershwins and their music.”).
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Businesses Structures in Copyright Artistic Legacy Maintenance
1.

The Gershwin Trusts

In the case of the Gershwin family, control of the copyrights for both
George and Ira is administered by a series of trusts established after
George’s death.207 A number of trusts administer the copyrights of
George and Ira Gershwin, including The George Gershwin Family Trust
(the “George Gershwin Trust”), which administers certain rights in the
works of George Gershwin,208 and The Leonore S. Gershwin Trust for the
Benefit of the Ira and Leonore Gershwin Designated Philanthropic Fund
(the “Gershwin Philanthropic Trust”) and The Leonore S. Gershwin Trust
for the Benefit of the Library of Congress (the “Gershwin LOC Trust”),
both of which derive revenue solely from the copyrights of Ira
Gershwin.209 All three Gershwin trusts support the arts and the creation of
new works.210
The Gershwin LOC Trust has the specific mission of protecting and
preserving “the musical history of Ira Gershwin” and managing the assets

207

Peyser, supra note 79, at 297-298 (noting that George Gershwin never

regained consciousness after surgery for a brain tumor and did not appear to
have considered or planned for his own death); New Grove, Gershwin, supra
note 73, at ___ noting that George Gershwin died on the morning of July 11,
1937 after emergency surgery for a brian tumor and was buried in Mount Hope
Cemetery, Hasting-on-Hudson, New York, following memorial services in New
York and Hollywood).
208

See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at Addendum, 2a.

209

Id.

210

Id.
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of the trust to “support the Library of Congress.”211 The Gershwin
Philanthropic Trust provides support “for artistic organizations, education
for children in the arts and certain medical facilities.”212
2.

The Gershwin Family and Control of Copyright and
Artistic Legacies by Heirs
a.

Control of Artistic Legacies

The combination of control and compensation in copyright is particularly
problematic in the case of heirs and other legal successors to copyright
interests. Copyright is often viewed as an incentive to reward creation.213
Even if aggregating control and compensation makes sense while a
composer is alive, justifying this combination in the case of heirs is not
quite the same. After the creator’s death, strategic uses of copyright
inevitably become paramount because at this point copyright can no
longer be seen as connected to incentives to create in most instances since
new works from the deceased creator could only come from works that
were either undiscovered or unpublished prior to the creator’s demise.
211

Gershwin LOC Trust 2002 Report, Guidestar EZ.com, available at

http://www.guidestar.org/controller/searchResults.gs?action_gsReport=1&npold
=394324 (summarizing figures derived from the Gershwin LOC Trust 2002 IRS
Form 990 Filing).
212

Gershwin Philanthropic Trust 2002 Report, Guidestar EZ.com, available at

http://www.guidestar.org/controller/searchResults.gs?action_gsReport=1&npold
=450500 (summarizing figures derived from the Gershwin Philanthropic Trust
2002 IRS Form 990 Filing).
213

Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 326 (“Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of

limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in
the first place.”).
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With popular writers, however, an option does exist by which a popular
writer’s works may be written after the writer’s death by others. This is
the case with the works of Robert Ludlum, for example, whose popular
fiction works featuring the character Jason Bourne have recently been
continued by Eric Van Lustbader, whose book The Bourne Legacy was
published in 2003, some two years after Ludlum’s death in March 2001.214
This particular avenue is probably not as readily available to music
composers or songwriters,215 although the post-mortem repackaging of
compilations of works of artists such as Elvis Presley, Jimi Hendrix and
others may be the closest equivalent in the music context.216
The extent to which control of copyright by heirs is an aspect of creators’
incentives to create may be an unanswered empirical question. Heirs and
legal successors are in most instances not creative.217 Constructing an
argument that justifies continued control of copyrighted works by heirs on
the grounds of giving incentives to create is far more tenuous that such
justifications in relation to creators. Moreover, even in the case of creators
themselves, little empirical evidence actually supports the notion that
copyright gives incentives to create.218 Even if leaving assets to heirs does
create incentives to create new works, it is not clear that copyright law
214

See ERIC VAN LUSTBADER, THE BOURNE LEGACY (2003).

215

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing differences in the application

of copyright to literature and music).
216

[cite example compilations]

217

See Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property,

Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 199
(2002) (noting that with the CTEA, “Congress acceded to the demands of
noncreative heirs and assignees of old but unexpired copyrights”).
218

See supra notes 38 to 42 and accompanying text.
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structures as they currently exist is the appropriate way to do this given the
need to balance the public interest in copyright.219 The desire to leave
assets to heirs as an incentive to create lends support to the idea that
compensation and control within copyright structures should, at least in
some instances, be disaggregated. The role of heirs in copyright touches
upon the sources of value that legal successors derive from copyright
protection and the differences between where they and creators may derive
value.
b.

The Value of Artistic Legacies

The value that estates of deceased artists and heirs derive from exercise of
copyright likely has nothing to do with creation and may even be far
removed from issues of musical integrity. This has been clearly evident in
the Gershwin case. In contrast to George Gershwin’s insistence on
playing his own music or controlling performers who played his music,220
the Gershwin family has “tended to authorize performances that gave the
most promise of financial return or favorable publicity, with less regard
for quality or integrity.”221 Since no new works are likely to emerge, at
least in any quantity, estates have potentially significantly different
interests in the rights that inhere in copyright. As a result, in the case of
estates in particular, factors that could be termed strategic, including the
extraction of revenues and control over image are often a predominant

219

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-16 (_____________).

220

Hamm, supra note 73, at 10 (noting that George Gershwin either performed

his music himself or insisted on “certain controls over other performers who
wanted to play his music”).
221

Id.
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focus.222 The Gershwin family, for example, has focused on controlling
all images disseminated about both Ira and George Gershwin to the extent
of refusing to release photographs unless stubble was airbrushed from
their portraits.223
The role of estates is increasingly relevant since copyright duration now
extends far beyond the life of the original creator. Use of copyright by
heirs thus brings attention to the control and compensation rights within
copyright as well as the fact that the control rights of copyright do not fit
well within the incentive model of copyright in this particular context.
Although control of copyrighted works may be desirable for reasons of
image and reputation, it is not clear that copyright should be a mechanism
for this, particularly since this really has little to do with the creation of
music. In the debate concerning the CTEA, heirs were quite active in
asserting their economic interests in term extension, citing the fact that
widows, children and legal successors would be harmed by a declaration
of the CTEA to be unconstitutional.224 The strategic uses of copyright by
heirs are rooted in the economic value of streams of licensing revenues
from copyright protected works. The economic value of such revenues

222

See Wall, supra note 195 (discussing the maintenance of the Elvis Presley

artistic legacy).
223

See Peyser, supra note 232, at 23.

224

See Brief Amici Curiae of Amsong, In Support of Respondent 2 (“It is the

widows, children and legal successors of the creators of these treasures [such as
Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue and Cole Porter’s Let’s Do It (Let’s Fall in Love)
that would fall into the public domain without the CTEA] who would be harmed
if the CTEA is declared unconstitutional.”).
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can be immense and can be greatly magnified after creators’ deaths.225
3.

The Value of Gershwin’s Works

The value of Gershwin’s works was high during his lifetime and only
increased following his death. Gershwin was quite commercially
successful during his lifetime and earned significant amounts of money for
many of his more popular works. Gershwin’s first hit song, Swanee, was
recorded by Al Jolson in 1920 and earned Gershwin $10,000 in
composer’s royalties in 1920 alone (approximately $_____ in 2004
dollars).226 The piano concerto Rhapsody in Blue, which was composed
on commission, earned Gershwin more than $250,000 between 1924 and
1934 (approximately $2.77 to $3.53 million in 2004 dollars) from
permissions and sales and rentals of the score.227 Gershwin received
$50,000 in 1930 (approximately $567,000 in 2004 dollars), for example,

225

This is evident in the case of Elvis Presley, whose bankrupt estate was said to

be worth less than $500,000 at the time of his death and whose value was greatly
augmented by the Presley estate’s gaining of control over finances and control
of the Presley image and name. See Wall, supra note 195.
226

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___.

227

Peyser, supra note 79, at 86 (noting that Gershwin received $250,000 during

the first 10 years of publication of the T.B. Harms two-piano version of
Rhapsody in Blue despite the fact that both parts were exceptionally difficult to
play); Richardson, supra note 103, at 170 (noting that Gershwin earned more
than $250,000 between 1924 and 1934 for Rhapsody in Blue); New Grove,
Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Rhapsody in Blue was composed
and performed for a well publicized concert organized by dance band leader
Paul Whiteman and was first performed on February 12, 1924 in a concert billed
as “An Experiment in Modern Music.”).
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for the use of Rhapsody in Blue in the film King of Jazz.228 In addition to
royalty income, Gershwin commanded significant fees for his songwriting
work. In 1930, for example, he and his brother earned fees of $100,000
(approximately $1.13 million in 2004 dollars) for the film Delicious and in
1932 they received $100,000 (approximately $1.38 million in 2004
dollars) for the Broadway musical Of Thee I Sing,229 which won a Pulitzer
prize for drama.230 Gershwin would also have earned royalties from the
publication of sheet music for such works. Some of the Gershwin
Broadway productions were also financially successful. Of Thee I Sing
ended its Broadway run with a gross of more than $1,400,000
(approximately $15.88 million in 2004 dollars).231
At the time of his death in 1938, Gershwin’s estate was listed at $430,841
gross (approximately $5.79 million in 2004 dollars) and $341,089 net
(approximately $4.58 million in 2004 dollars).232 Gershwin’s works
continued to be valuable after his death. The value of Gershwin’s works,
from a licensing perspective, has increased in recent years. In 2002, a
nationwide license of a Gershwin work was valued at $250,000, an
increase from a value of $45,000 to $75,000 fifteen years prior to that
228

Jablonski, supra note 83, at 183.

229

The figures for Delicious and Of Thee I Sing reflect the amounts for both

George and Ira, who split fees two-thirds to one-third. See Peyser, supra note
79, at 127, 180, 196.
230

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 76, at ___.

231

Id. at 196.

232

See Peyser, supra note 79, at 298 (noting that the value of specific pieces in

the residuary estate included Rhapsody in Blue ($20,125), An American in Paris
($5,000), Of Thee I Sing ($4,000), Concerto in F ($1,750) and Porgy and Bess
($250)).
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time.233 Rhapsody in Blue became United Airlines theme song for
$500,000.234
Today, close to 70 years after George’s death and some 20 years after Ira’s
death, the Gershwin family trusts continue to realize significant revenue
streams from George and Ira Gershwin copyrights. In the case of the
Gershwin Philanthropic Trust and Gershwin LOC Trust, which relate to
Ira, for example, trust revenues were in excess of $6 million each or close
to $13 million in aggregate between 1998 and 2002 as reported on trust
IRS Form 990 filings.235 In addition to garnering significant revenues
from uses of copyrighted works, the Gershwin family significantly
233

See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 29; David D. Kirkpatrick, Media;

Publishers and Libraries Square Off Over Free Online Access to Books, NY
TIMES, June 17, 2002, at C7; John J. Fialka, Music: Songwriters' Heirs Mourn
Copyright Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at B1 (noting that a nationwide
license for a Gershwin song went for between $200,000 and $250,000 in 1997,
in contrast to the $45,000 to $75,000 the license would have cost 15 years prior
to that time).
234

Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 29; Fialka, supra note 233, at B1 (noting the

soaring value of old songs and fact that three companies, AT&T Corp., Ford
Motor Co. and Farmers Insurance Group, were “currently running television ads
featuring songs written by the Gershwins”).
235

The exact figures for this time period for the Gershwin Philanthropic Trust

are $6,332,724 (revenues), $7,720,696 (expenses), $4,769,089 (average assets),
$3,594,948 (grants and allocations) and $932,605 (compensation of officers and
directors). See Form 990 Filings of The Gershwin Philanthropic Trust, 19982003. Figures for the Gershwin LOC Trust are $6,450,098 (revenues),
$6,835,189 (expenses), $3,925,999 (average assets), $136,399 (average
liabilities), $3,185,275 (grants and allocations) and $932,605 (compensation of
officers and directors). See Form 990 Filings of The Gershwin LOC Trust,
1998-2003.
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controls the use and interpretation of such works.
D.

Control of Porgy and Bess

Porgy and Bess is one of George Gershwin’s greatest achievements and
constitutes his magnum opus.236 In addition to being Gershwin’s last
major work, Gershwin described Porgy and Bess as a “labor of love.”237
Since Gershwin’s death, the Gershwin family has closely controlled
performances of Porgy and Bess, particularly with respect to casting.
Porgy and Bess illustrates a number of different ways in which the control
aspects of copyright may be manifested, including issues connected to
control by heirs, control of future performances of works, control of
reinterpretation of works and control of future borrowings from works.
1.

Control by Heirs: The Gershwin Trusts and Family
Control

Control of copyright by heirs is increasingly important given the current
length of copyright terms. The most recent copyright term extension
intensifies the influences of heirs on the exercise of copyright. As a result,
any consideration of the use of copyright should consider how heirs use
copyright, both in terms of control of future borrowing, performances and
reinterpretations and with respect to strategic expansion of existing rights.
The Gershwin trusts were not surprisingly strong proponents of the CTEA
236

See Johnson, supra note 38, at 111 (noting that Porgy and Bess is among

Gershwin’s greatest achievements and certainly constitutes his magnum opus);
Crawford, supra note 105, at 21 (describing Porgy and Bess as Gershwin’s
magnum opus).
237

See Johnson, supra note 38, at 111.
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and participated in a brief for Eldred.238 As was the case with Disney,
George Gershwin’s works would have entered the public domain in the
next few years without the 20-year extension given under the CTEA.239 In
addition to assuring such heirs continued streams of licensing revenues for
a longer period of time, however, the CTEA also permits continued
control of copyright protected works for uses and purposes that have little
to do with the creation of new works.
2.

Controlling Borrowing: The Irony of Gershwin Family
Restrictions

Copyright control aspects often serve to limit future uses of copyrighted
works, which is ironic in the Gershwin case given the extent to which
Gershwin used musical borrowing as an indispensable part of his
compositional style.240 Current copyright standards significantly restrict
borrowing and uses of existing works unless such borrowings or uses fall
within an exception that may rebut a charge of copyright infringement.
Existing exceptions include fair use and de minimis use.241 In this
manner, copyright protection substantially privileges incumbents, who are
permitted to borrow while restricting others from borrowing or using their
238

See Gifford, supra note 19, at 385 (“Other notable lobbyists included the

Gershwin family, whose copyright on George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue””
was due to expire.”).
239

See Sabra Chartrand, Patents; Congress Has Extended its Protection for

Goofy, Gershwin and Some Moguls of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998,
at C2 (noting that at the time of adoption of the CTEA, the songs of Ira and
George Gershwin were scheduled to lose copyright protection in the next few
years).
240

See supra notes 93 to 140 and accompanying text.

241

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1, at ___.
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copyrighted works in the future to create new works. With the current
long duration of copyright, the inclusion of control features within
copyright are increasingly problematic, which is reflected in the assertions
of opponents of the CTEA about the influence of current copyright
duration on the public domain.
3.

Controlling Performances: The Gershwin Trusts and
Racial Casting

Control of future performances is another aspect of the exercise of control
by copyright holders. With respect to Porgy and Bess, the control aspect
of the exercise of copyright by the Gershwin family is most evident in its
control of the manner of Porgy and Bess performances. The George
Gershwin Trust closely controls casting of Porgy and Bess by stipulating
that certain performances of Porgy and Bess be performed such that
characters in the opera that are black must be cast with black singers:242
242

Although many discussions indicate that the Gershwin family requires an all

black cast, this is not actually entirely true because Porgy and Bess includes
characters such as Archdale that are not black. See Gail Russell Chaddock,
When Is Art Free? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1998, at B1 (noting racial
casting); see also Garon, supra note 13, at 595-596 (“When Washington’s
Shakespeare Theater decided to cast a white actor, Patrick Stewart, as Othello
along with an all-black cast last year, they didn’t need permission from
Shakespeare’s heirs, because the play was already in the public domain. But a
theater group wanting to perform Porgy and Bess with an all-white cast could
not, because the Gershwin Family Trust stipulates that the work can be
performed only with an all-black cast.”) (citing Chaddock, supra); Symposium,
Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 808 (2003) (noting Gershwin estate
requirement that Porgy and Bess have a cast that is all black); Christine Quintos,
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For example, even when Mr. Gershwin licenses the full grand
musical play “Porgy and Bess,” he demands that each performance
meet a number of requirements. One such requirement is that the
play be performed by a Black cast and a Black chorus. The reason
for this is quite simple. George and Ira Gershwin created “Porgy
and Bess” to be a musical play about Southern Blacks. Today, Mr.
Gershwin demands of companies, including the New York
Metropolitan Opera, that their non-Black contract players be paid
not to perform in productions of “Porgy and Bess” and that they be
replaced with Black actors and actresses.243
The Gershwin family is able to enforce this stipulation by virtue of the
control rights given them within copyright structures and their typical
retention of grand rights.244 Whether such racial casting is appropriate is
an ongoing dialogue among singers and other musicians. Simon Estes, the
African American bass-baritone, who was not cast as Wotan in the
Wagner opera Parsifal because he is African American, has stated that he
“considers the all-black cast stipulation a disservice both to ‘Porgy and
Bess’ and the cause of integration.”245 The Porgy and Bess stipulation
Case Notes and Comments: Congress’ Green Monster: Copyright Extension and
the Concern for Cash over the Propagation of Art, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. 109 (2002) (noting creative control of Gershwin Family trust over Porgy
and Bess in allowing only an all African American cast to perform the play).
243

Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9.

244

Id. at *11-12; see also infra note 246.

245

Anthony Tommasini, All-Back Casts for “Porgy”? That Ain’t Necessarily

So, NY TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at E1 (noting the Gershwin estate stipulation that
Porgy and Bess be performed by an all black cast, noting the difficulties in
assembling such casts and interviewing African American bass-baritone Simon

Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Copyright on Catfish Row

74

does not apply to concert versions of the opera, but only staged versions.
In some instances, the Gershwins have transferred rights to some songs to
music publishers, particularly with respect to small performing rights or
nondramatic rights.246 As a result, a concert performance of Porgy and
Bess would not be subject to the casting restriction. In contrast, a staged
performance of Porgy and Bess with costumes would require a license
from the Gershwins even if performing rights or nondramatic rights had
been transferred to music publishers, because in such an instance, grand
performing rights (grand rights or dramatic rights) would be needed. The
Gershwins have typically retained such grand rights.247 The racial casting
restriction in Porgy and Bess has led to Porgy and Bess serving as a
springboard for many African American classical performers, including
Leontyne Price and William Warfield,248 who performed Porgy and Bess
early in their respective careers. Regardless of whether racial casting is
justified, such control is clearly not an essential or necessary feature of
copyright.249 Further, the use of copyright evident in Porgy and Bess, as is
Estes, who discusses the refusal of an opera director to cast him as Wotan in
Wagner’s opera Parsifal because he is African American, and who “considers
the all-black cast stipulation a disservice both to “Porgy and Bess” and the cause
of integration”).
246

Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *___.

247

See Gershwin v. Whole Thing, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *11-12.

248

David Schiff, The Man Who Breathed Life into ‘Porgy and Bess’, NY TIMES,

Mar. 5, 2000, at 35 (discussing the New York City Opera production of Porgy
and Bess and noting that the opera has “served as a springboard for the careers
of so many great black singers, including Todd Duncan, William Warfield,
Leontyne Price, Donnie Ray Albert, Clamma Dale and Wilhelmenia Fernandez).
249

See Tommasini, supra note 245 (noting that “if nontraditional casting is

going to work, it has to be applied to all operas, ‘Porgy and Bess’ included).

Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Copyright on Catfish Row

75

true of many strategic uses of copyright, may actually undermine the
public interest side of the copyright balance.
4.

Controlling Reinterpretation: The Implications of Casting
Control

Racial casting is just one illustration of the type of creative control that
copyright permits with its current framework that combines control and
compensation.250 Racial casting also touches on the meaning of cultural
texts and whose interpretation should govern uses of such texts. Current
copyright structures give copyright holders the ability to impose unitary
meanings of their determination on copyright protected material that they
control. In the case of heirs, those who control copyright and artistic
legacy following the death of a creator often have the right to impose their
preferred meanings with respect to uses of protected texts. In either case,
the control aspect of copyright has potential to stifle seriously the creation
of future works by preventing current creators from using copyright
protected works for their new creations as well as suppress alternative
interpretation of existing texts.251 Such suppression of alternate
interpretations may actually be a disincentive to the production of future
works and have the potential to create a chilling effect on artistic

250

See Gerald Nachman, Letter, Let’s Say Enough to Corporate Welfare, NY

TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at ___
251

See Ida Shum, Note, Getting “Ripped” Off by Copy-Protected CDs, 29 J.

LEGIS. 125, 223 (2002) (noting that those controlling the Gershwin trusts do not
have “any more competence to understand and convey the real ‘meaning’ of his
works than others who might hear his works); Karjala, supra note 217, at 222.
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expression and creation.252 In the case of the Gershwin family, the family
has even hindered the access of scholars that might produce alternative
interpretations.253
IV.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
CONTEXTS OF COPYRIGHT

A.

Incentives to Create and the Value of Copyright

The uses of copyright by creators such as Gershwin and his heirs draw
attention to the implications of copyright structures for cultural
expression.254 Initial allocations of rights matter.255 The argument that
copyright, even though an imperfect tool, is acceptable or should be
expanded because it gives some incentive to creators that will translate
into a societal benefit is fundamentally flawed, at least in certain instances.
A holder of a copyright could likely take any right given it and wield

252

See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106

YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
253

See Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (noting role of Gershwin family in impeding

understanding of Gershwin’s music).
254

See FEP, Intellectual Freedom, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that the Eldred

court decision ignored the law’s adverse effects on culture).
255

Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L REV. 106, 112

(2002) (“Where the Coase Theorem blunders is in suggesting that no matter the
initial allocation of the entitlement, people will bargain to the same result. The
Coase Theorem fails to account for the fact that the initial allocation seems to
create an endowment effect. When the endowment effect is at work, those who
initially receive a legal right value it more than they would if the initial
allocation had given the right to someone else. There is a great deal of evidence
to this effect.”) (citations omitted).
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ownership of such a right for its benefit.256 This does not validate the
initial assignment of the right to the to the holder in the first place or
structuring the scope of such rights so as to ensure that the holder’s
grandchildren have a right to receive not only income from the holder’s
creations, but also to substantially control all uses and interpretations of
the holder’s works:
Continued and widespread performances of “Let's Call the Whole
Thing Gershwin” have a substantial possibility of destroying the
goodwill associated with Gershwin works by mutilating the
carefully sculptured works of art so tenaciously preserved by Mr.
[Ira] Gershwin over the years. “Let's Call the Whole Thing
Gershwin” is an agglomeration of Gershwin compositions from a
large number of different Gershwin musical plays. In effect Whole
Thing has taken the arm of one Gershwin sculpture and grafted it
onto the body of another, while using a head or another arm from
still other Gershwin sculptures. The resulting damage to the
Gershwin sculptures is immeasurable and perhaps irreparable. 257
Musical works are not truly comparable to sculptures in this way, partly
because musical notes, in particular are not representational, whereas
sculptures more often are.258
256

Julio H. Cole, Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs?,

15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 79, 83 (2001) (“Obviously, like any other monopoly
privilege, patents can be valuable for their owners, though that is not in itself a
sufficient reason to justify concessions of that sort.”).
257

Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9-10.

258

Susan McClary, The Blasphemy of Talking Politics during Bach Year, in

MUSIC AND SOCIETY:

THE POLITICS OF COMPOSITION, PERFORMANCE AND
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The view of musical works expressed by the court in Gershwin v. The
Whole Thing is distorted in that it fails to recognize the musical borrowing
that was so central to Gershwin’s creative processes and the creative
processes of many other composers.259 Moreover, the notion of musical
works being comprised of inseparable elements is clearly not an argument
that even the Gershwin family follows in practice since they have
historically been quite happy to decapitate sculptures and license songs or
parts of songs from works for use in commercials, for example.260 In
addition, the Gershwin family in fact authorized performances of the 1992
Tony award winning Broadway musical Crazy For You,261 which was
comprised of pieces from different Gershwin musicals, which seriously
undercuts the logic of the court’s argument in Gershwin v. The Whole
Thing.
In addition, serious consideration needs to be paid to how the structure of
values surrounding intellectual property rights is actually assembled in
particular instances. Current evaluations of intellectual property
frameworks are based on universal and unitary notions of value.262 As a
RECEPTION 13, 16 (Richard Leppert & Susan McClary eds., 1987) (noting that
music appears to be non-representational, unlike literature and the visual arts,
which make use of characters, plots, color and shapes that resemble everyday
world phenomenon).
259

See supra notes 93 to 159 and accompanying text; see also Arewa, Hip Hop,

supra note 1.
260

See supra notes 227 to 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

value of Gershwin song licenses.
261
262

See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.

L. REV. 779, 794 (1994) (“. . . with assumption of a unitary kind of valuation,
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result, they focus on intellectual property rights as tools of innovation
generally and assume that innovation and the products resulting from such
innovation are the major sources of value for holders of such rights in
specific cases. One result of this approach is that the entirety of behaviors
that surround uses of intellectual property rights by holders in other ways
and for other purposes are often not recognized, let alone adequately
explained.263 The fact that copyrights are now used as sources to be mined
for licensing revenue,264 has potentially profound implications for
copyright frameworks whose goal is to promote the creation of new
works. Examining the broader context of copyright usage can reveal other
sources of value that supplement or substitute for those typically assumed
and that may also elucidate the behaviors of copyright holders.
One of the major reasons copyright holders may wield copyrights as
strategic weapons is that they gain value by doing so. In addition to
potentially imposing costs that may be unlike those contemplated by
courts and legal commentators, the benefits copyright holders may accrue

we will sometimes offer inadequate predictions, explanations and
recommendations for law”).
263

See Giddens, supra note 50, at 30 (“normative elements of social systems are

contingent claims which have to be sustained and ‘made to count’ through the
effective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters.
Normative sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination, and the
relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various sorts other than
expressions of the commitments those norms supposedly engender”).
264

See Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture

Got to Do with It?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 230 (2000) (noting that
in twentieth century, copyright was “looked to as means for securing and
protecting income streams, and it has been expanded accordingly”).
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may similarly be different and need to be examined more closely. This
value may include benefits such as securing streams of licensing income,
blocking or preventing commercial competitors or alternative uses or
interpretations, bolstering the creator’s public image, increased market
capitalization, increasing stockholder value, gaining greater attractiveness
to potential acquirers or investors or other factors.265 These benefits may
thus impose significant costs on other potential users of the underlying
knowledge on which such copyrights are based. Since the magnitude and
importance of borrowing in cultural expression is often underestimated,
the extent of these costs may not always be fully recognized.
Consequently, how copyright holders wield their rights also has significant
implications for the underlying knowledge upon which their copyrights
are based.
B.

Copyright and Underlying Knowledge: The Implications of the
Double Intangible

An intellectual property right may be conceived as involving a double
intangible or two distinguishable levels of intangible resources.266 The
first is the intellectual property right itself, such as a copyright.
Underlying this intellectual property right intangible is the knowledge
upon which the right is based, which constitutes yet another intangible. In
the case of Gershwin compositions, for example, the double intangible
would be evident at the level of the copyright itself, which would protect
265

See supra notes 61 to 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of SCO.

266

Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (noting that an intellectual

property right involves two levels of intangibility, one level relating to the
intellectual property right itself and an underlying intangible resource embodied
in the knowledge upon which the intellectual property right is based).

Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Copyright on Catfish Row

81

the notes and lyrics comprising the piece of music. These notes and lyrics
are, however, based on underlying knowledge that might be reflected in a
number of factors, including common musical traditions upon which the
copyrighted work is based, musical passages that might have been
borrowed from prior works, the public domain, or existing musical
traditions or note sequences such as blue notes that reflect the influence of
jazz and blues traditions. 267
An intellectual property right in this sense can be seen as one way to
represent, characterize and allocate ownership interests with respect to
particular configurations of such underlying knowledge. The Eldred court
recognized this distinction in noting that copyright involves no monopoly
over knowledge.268 Although this is true in some respects, it does not
completely account for the behavioral aspects of copyright enforcement,
particularly with respect to the control of meaning and reinterpretation of
cultural texts and the existence of strategic behaviors that may magnify the
chilling effect on the ability of others’ to use knowledge. These factors
may effectively give copyright holders a monopoly over underlying
knowledge.
The nature of this underlying knowledge determines whether an
267

New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (“Perhaps the most striking characteristic

of Gershwin’s melodies is their reliance on blue notes . . . Occasionally the blues idiom
provides a harmonic structure for Gershwin, as in the second of his three piano preludes on
the 12-bar blues progression. That progression also serves as a reference in the Concerto’s
[Rhapsody in Blue] second movement and in An American in Paris.”).
268

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (“[C]opyright gives the holder no

monopoly on any knowledge. A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any
fact or idea she acquires from her reading.”).
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intellectual property right may be attached to the underlying knowledge.
The fact that a creator’s work is copyrightable reflects a determination that
the particular configuration of underlying knowledge in the work is
worthy of intellectual property protection. Copyright frameworks thus
embed assumptions about the nature of knowledge that merits copyright
protection. Typically, only underlying knowledge that is deemed
sufficiently original is copyrightable.269 The scope and duration of the
copyright similarly reflects societal assumptions about value reflected in
choices about the types and duration of protection to be included within
copyright frameworks.
Borrowing is often part of what makes cultural texts recognizable to other
participants in the cultural context from which such texts emerge. New
creations are frequently framed in light of and in relation to past
experience.270 Copyright as currently constructed involves substantial
denial of borrowing and collaboration.271 Much of the discourse of CTEA
269

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (“One key aspect of the development of

copyright in the United States, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards,
has been an overriding focus on what constitutes sufficient originality to make a
creation copyrightable.”) (citations omitted).
270

This framing is evident in terminology and language used to describe new

innovations. For example, the motion picture is a picture that moves, a car a
horseless carriage and the Internet the information superhighway.
271

William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the

Ownership of Ideas in the United States at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iphistory.html. (“Today, most
writing (indeed, most creativity of all sorts) is collaborative. Equally
importantly, the extent to which every creator depends upon and incorporates
into her work the creations of her predecessors is becoming ever more obvious.
Yet American lawmakers cling stubbornly to the romantic vision. There are few
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proponents with respect to the creation of cultural texts reflects a denial or
deemphasis of borrowing and collaboration.272 This position is in line
with the revenue stream value maximization approach also taken by many
CTEA proponents.273 This denial comes out of the seeming need to
allocate clear and determinate property rights with respect to the
knowledge that underlies copyrights. This underlying knowledge is thus
construed as a separable fragment that can be alienated from broader
fabric in which it is enmeshed and effectively given to the copyright
holder for a specified period of time. This grant of a copyright to the
holder is characterized as a reward for the holder’s creative activities.
Copyright, however, typically encompasses knowledge relating to
elements that may be original contributions of the creator as well as
preexisting knowledge that is borrowed and then enfolded within the new
work.
Once these preexisting and new elements are integrated, though, the
tendency is to view the holder as having intellectual property rights with
respect to the entirety of the underlying knowledge, including the
preexisting knowledge.274 This tendency is reinforced when copyrights
have longer duration because those viewing or hearing a work are likely
signs that it is losing its grip on the law. Indeed the recent introduction into
American copyright law of (a variant of) the Continental theory of moral rights
suggests that its power may be waxing, not waning.”) (citations omitted).
272
273

See Shum, supra note 251, at 146 (noting profit maximization approach of

entities with vast holdings of copyrights).
274

See, e.g., Garon, supra note 13, at 549-553 (noting that the ProCD court case

would permit control of noncopyrightable elements of copyrighted work); see
also ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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increasingly removed over time from the original context of creation of
the work. As a result, discerning borrowed elements of a work is likely to
become more difficult as copyright duration increases. Increased duration
may thus make even assessments of whether and the extent to which other
works infringe on an existing work more difficult. Similarly, contrary to
the assumptions of the Eldred court, strategic behaviors make
monopolization of underlying knowledge a more likely outcome by virtue
of a potential chilling effect on borrowing for fear of threats of litigation
or actual suit.275
The Romantic author concept, which emphasizes the unique and geniuslike contributions of individual creators and inventors, is a primary
mechanism by which borrowing and collaboration are denied.276 Modern
conceptions of authorship as involving inspiration, originality and even
genius in the creation of autonomous cultural texts are a fairly recent
historical development.277 Such conceptions are nonetheless used to
justify allocation of property rights to authors or those deemed worthy of
275

See supra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text.

276

See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in

THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 15, 21 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing
the “modern myth that genuine authorship consists in individual acts of
origination”).
277

See Janet Wolff, Foreword: The Ideology of Autonomous Art, in MUSIC AND

SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF COMPOSITION, PERFORMANCE AND RECEPTION 1, 2
(Richard Leppert & Susan McClary eds., 1987) (“The Romantic notion of the
autonomy of art, which is still dominant in the late twentieth century, is
essentially a product of nineteenth-century ideology and social structure.”);
Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing Romantic author notions with respect
to popular and classical music).
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such ownership rights by virtue of their genius, autonomy and
originality.278
Without diminishing the significance of acts of creation, the rhetoric of
authorship and notions of autonomous creation obscure the actual
processes by which creations and inventions actually come into being.
Many acknowledge that cultural production involves some sort of
borrowing or collaboration.279 Fewer, however, fully consider the
implications of such borrowings and collaborations.
Consequently, additional consideration should be given to the fact that
texts often reflect collaboration and borrowing rather than autonomy and
independent creation and that acts of creation do not and should not
necessarily involve original or novel elements. Instead, creators often
synthesize and borrow, use existing material and model their creations on
the works of others.280 This is the essence of borrowing that is often
denied, ignored or minimized in discussions of copyright and creation.
278

See Martha Woodmansee, Genius and the Copyright, in THE AUTHOR, ART,

AND THE MARKET 35,
279

37 (1994).

Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property

Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) (noting that knowledge is cumulative and
that inventors build on what came before); Richard H. Stern, Legal Protection of
Screen Displays and Other User Interfaces for Computers: A Problem in
Balancing Incentives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to the
Utilitarian, 14 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 283, 301 (1989-1990) (noting that
screen design techniques are cumulative result of incremental contributions by
mass on anonymous workers and not identifiable as creations of particular
individuals).
280

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing borrowing in classical, hop hop and other

popular music).
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From a legal perspective the critical question turns on how to allocate
rights, in the form of copyrights with regard to underlying knowledge, and
thus establish bounds of acceptable appropriation and mediate between
existing and original elements that comprise a particular text. As part of
this allocation process, tensions between notions of collective rights and
individual rights must in some manner be addressed or resolved.281
C.

General Concepts of Creation and Specific Production of Cultural
Texts

In addition to not adequately considering the implications of specific costs
and benefits evident in the contexts of copyright use, general views of
cultural production evident in legal discussions about copyright do not
adequately envisage the specific and varied ways in which cultural
production actually occurs. One way to view originality is as a
construction intended to represent a particular notion of how underlying
knowledge is constituted. As a result, conceptions of original expression
and determination of what constitutes original expression in large part
determine what uses are deemed infringements of copyrights based upon
such knowledge. The notion of cultural text that pervades copyright
commentary can be characterized as highly unitary. Such interpretations
are rooted in a unitary view of creation that typically denies borrowing and
collaboration in creation and the reality of varied aesthetics of creative
production and reconstructs the nature of cultural production to suit this

281

Leighton McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, 22

MELB. U. L. REV. 310, 316 (1998) (discussing whether collective and individual
rights can coexist in the same normative discourse).
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unitary worldview.282 As Gershwin and other examples in the music
context suggest, this view of cultural production and invention does not
adequately reflect the complex and varied nature of motivations to create
new works or complexities of the process by which such new works are
synthesized and created.283
One potential consequence is a decrease in the public domain and
reduction in diversity of cultural texts that exist by virtue of the
valorization of autonomous creation, which by its nature may permit
greater amounts of extraction of material from the public domain because
of its denial of borrowing. The issue is not just one of keeping certain
items in the public domain. Also at issue is the process by which the
public domain is constituted and the types of texts whose creation or use is
deemed permissible under existing copyright rules. Although recognition
exists in legal scholarship concerning the general fact that cultural texts
interact with the public domain,284 few conceptualize or fully discuss the
282

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing historical and cultural specificity of

conceptions of musical composition).
283

See supra notes 38 to 42 and accompanying text; see also Arewa, Hip Hop,

supra note 1.
284

See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-967 (1990) (noting

failure of copyright’s paradigm of authorship to account for the raw materials that all
authors use); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual
Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 1-2 (2002) (noting the little attention
given the public domain in intellectual property statutes, cases and scholarly discourse);
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 33 (2001) (discussing the perceived negative effects of strong
intellectual property rights on innovation and freedom); R. Polk Wagner, Information
Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM L.
REV. 995 (2003) (arguing that intellectual property rights, even in their strong form, are
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specific processes by which such texts and the public domain are
constituted, particularly in the specific areas of cultural texts and music.
D.

Controlling Interpretation and Meaning in Cultural Discourses

The current manner of allocation of copyright ownership rights has
significant implications for social meaning. This is not just a reflection of
the fact that copyright involves elements of expressive culture, but also
because choices made about copyright rules reflect social norms and have
significance for symbolic aspects of cultural production and meaning.285
Descriptions of the outcomes of such choices form an aspect of the
expressive function of law in that they identify which “consequences
count and how they should be described.”286
Consequently, the exclusionary aspects of intellectual property rights
reflected in control rights also result in exclusion with respect to the
making and contesting of cultural meanings.287 Such unitary views are

likely to increase the public domain); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public
Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2004) (noting that firms place information in the public
domain to preempt or undermine the potential property rights of economic adversaries);
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 354 (1999) (discussing effects of
enclosure on the organization of information production).
285

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.

286

Cass R. Sunstein, Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of

Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2048 (1996).
287

See Mahdavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV 495, 592 (2001)

(discussing situations where “the self-proclaimed guardians of culture are
excluding other members of the culture from making and contesting cultural
meanings.”) (citations omitted).
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reflected, for example, in the Gershwin family’s control over casting in
Porgy and Bess. Such control has significant implications for public
policy and social meaning within the broader context of contemporary
discourse about race and nonconventional casting, for example.
Systematically ignoring or otherwise denying that certain consequences
are significant, influences the shape of important means of cultural
expression.288 The control aspects of intellectual property rights can
impede the development of cultural texts and production of new cultural
meanings around existing texts, reinforcing reified and unitary s of
culture.289 This contrasts with a more nuanced anthropological and
folkloristic conception of culture and cultural texts with a multiplicity of
meanings and variants.290 One reason for the unitary conception of
cultural texts is rooted in a misconception of the cultural context of the
production of such texts. Such misconceptions construe creation as

288

See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as

Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990)
(discussing the implications for trademark law of trademarked symbols being
increasingly used as vehicles through which social meaning is conveyed).
289

See Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The

Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 147 (1996-1997).
290

See WOLFGANG MIEDER, TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN FOLK LITERATURE

xi (1987) (“Such traditional texts, certainly oral texts, exist by repletion and
therefore in numerous variants.”); Sunder, supra note 287 (discussing the role of
law in unitary view of culture that is associated with the suppression of cultural
dissent).
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autonomous in a way that reflects Romantic author conceptions.291 As a
result, a tendency exists to see the flow of cultural meaning and ownership
rights in creations as a one-way movement toward the copyright holder,
who can capture all cultural meaning attached to or associated with the
intellectual property right and impede any flow of meaning outward.292
In looking at this process the potential incommensurability of scales used
must be noted.293 How different participants in this process value cultural
expression might be quite different both in quantitative and qualitative
terms, to the extent that the same scale may not in fact be able to be used.
As a result, the values of producers are not all the same, and commercial
actors may assign very different values than noncommercial actors. Heirs
may assign different values than creators, and the values of diffusers and
second comers may yet again be dissimilar. Values expressed by courts
and in legal scholarship may similarly be quite disparate.
The recognition and mediation of these multiplicities of potential uses,
values and interpretations are important. A unitary and reified view of
291

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of borrowing in the

creation of music in all genres and periods and the systematic inattention to the pervasive
nature of borrowing in musical composition in legal discourse about music).
292

Once extracted from a collaborative or communal context, it is not always

clear how the uncopyrightable distinct elements comprising knowledge now
subject to an intellectual property right might be used. See supra note 274 and
accompanying text.
293

See Sunstein, supra note 262; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the

Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 8 (1975) (“Disputes about
the meaning of ‘value’ are possible . . . These disputes over the meaning of
‘value’ may take the form of controversies about what rules of ownership and
change are best or most acceptable.”).
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culture makes imposition of a single and unitary view of the function of
copyright and social meaning derived from the uses of copyright easier.
Such unitary meanings are increasingly weighted heavily in favor of
commercial interests.294 The result is a reinforcement of controlling
discourse of intellectual property rights holders who are already quite
powerful and who have other means of protecting themselves from
alternative and even subversive meanings.295 Separating control from
compensation in copyright doctrine is potentially one way to ameliorate
this tendency for control of copyright to extend to control of meaning and
reinterpretation and restore a multiplicity of possible meanings and
interpretations of cultural texts.
V.

UNFAIR USE AND TRANSMISSION-BASED APPROACHES TO MUSICAL
COPYRIGHT

The goals and beneficiaries of copyright frameworks have long been a
contested issue in American copyright doctrine.296 Reconsideration
should be given to the construction of copyright frameworks and the
behaviors that come along with these architectures. Copyrights should be
294

LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY

AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004);

Litman, supra note 70, at 22-23 (1996) (discussing role of commercial and
institutional actors in copyright law).
295

See ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTIES (1998) (discussing the implications of hegemonic discourses).
296

See William Patry, Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the

Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, ___ (1997) (“Since the inception of
American copyright law at the end of the eighteenth century, legislators and
scholars have struggled with two fundamental, related issues. First, what is the
purpose of copyright? Second, to whom should benefits be granted?”).
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granted and enforced in a way that is informed by the context of their
operation and consideration of the underlying rationales of copyright and
actual uses of copyright.
A.

Control, Compensation and the Appropriation of Returns

The rationales used to justify copyright protection have been widely
considered and discussed.297 Current copyright structures typically allow
holders to have effective control rights with respect to underlying
knowledge resources by virtue of copyright statutory language that gives
copyright holders substantial ability to control uses of copyright protected
works.298 In addition, holders are able to seek judicial and legislative
enforcement or expansion of their rights. Through such enforcement,
holders may play a potentially significant role in determining the scope of
their rights and influencing which uses by others may be deemed an
infringement. This ability to control is thus fundamentally related to
strategic intellectual property behaviors.299 For copyright holders, control
297

Many of these rationales are not new and have long been used to provide

support for intellectual property rights protection. See, e.g., William Fisher,
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988-1989); Netanel,
supra note 252, at 290 (1996); Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments
for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 138-167 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Hurt &
Schuchman, supra note 33; PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1996).
298

See infra notes 312 to 319 and accompanying text.

299

See Giddens, supra note 50, at 288 (noting that assessing the strategic actions

of businesses means “giving primacy to discursive and practical consciousness,
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rights are often viewed through a compensatory lens. As a result, such
rights are seen as the mechanism by which the copyright holder can and in
fact should ensure that it receives compensation on account of the holder’s
creation or synthesis of the underlying knowledge.300 This connection
between control and compensation, however, is neither inevitable nor
necessary. It would be possible, for example, to structure an intellectual
property system that offered a compensation mechanism without entitling

and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries”); see also
supra notes 61 to 72 and accompanying text.
300

See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic

Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1610 (1982) (“If the creators of intellectual productions were given no rights to
control the use made of their works, they might receive few revenues and would
lack an appropriate level of incentive to create. Fewer resources would be
devoted to intellectual productions than their social merit would warrant.”);
Anthony L. Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, Silicon Epics and
Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1500-1501 (1987) (advocating
copyright protection for software programs and noting that the software industry
could be imperiled without such protection); Michael J. Meurer, Price
Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital
Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 848 (1997) (noting that copyright advocates argue
that “fairness requires that authors and publishers should be able to keep their
share of the copyright pie in the face of new technologies”); Richard B. Graves,
Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Failure of the Copyright Clause, 80 NEB.
L. REV. 64, 65 (2001) (”the economic effect of copyright protection is to reserve
to authors the monetary value of their works by making sales of infringing
works more difficult and less profitable. This protection ensures that those who
produce copyrightable works are far better able to support themselves by doing
so”) (citations omitted).
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the holder to control rights in their current form.301
These elements of control and compensation thus form a primary
foundation for economic rationales for copyright, which emphasize
appropriability, or the ability of creators to ensure that they receive a profit
or return from their creations, as a source of incentives to create.302 The
301

See, e.g., Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 33, at 426 (“. . . without some

device to assist authors in receiving compensation for their services, some works
with high costs of creation . . . may not be produced at all. However, it does not
necessarily follow that the grant of a copyright monopoly is the only such device
possible, nor is it the most desirable device”); Cole, supra note 256, at 99-101
(discussing alternative structures for compensation of creators in absence of a
copyright regime); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 282 (1970) (noting it would be possible without copyright to arrange for
compensation of authors); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004)
(discussing replacing copyright with a governmentally administered rewards
system).
302

See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTING INNOVATION

AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7

(2004) (noting that “incentives provided by

copyright protection are designed to encourage innovation by creators.”)
(hereinafter “CED Report”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197-1198 (1996) (noting instrumental rationale
for copyright as incentive and Locke labor desert theories are both based on
imagery of expanding copyright protection to relieve the plight of the author);
Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, Sidney G. Winger,
Richard Gilbert & Zvi Griliches, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
783, 783 (1987); Lemley, supra note 279, at 993 (noting that intellectual
property is about incentives to invent and create); Netanel, supra note 252, at
308-310 (distinguishing between neoclassical approaches and economic
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appropriation of returns is seen as permitting the creator to generate ex
post rents by pricing any products or services in which such right is
embedded like a monopolist and thus recouping high upfront costs it may
have incurred in developing the knowledge resources underlying
intellectual property rights, as well as realize a profit.303 The behaviors

incentive rationales for copyright, the first of which focus on copyright as a
regime of broad, fully exchangeable property rights in creative products with
allocative efficiency goal, which justifies giving “copyright owners maximum
rights and leaving allocation of those rights up to the market;” the second of
which sees copyright as a limited grant, focusing on finding the “right amount of
copyright protection required to give adequate production incentive.”); Roger E.
Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Property or
Monopoly, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 913 (1990) (“The standard
argument for a patent system is that innovators will not have sufficient incentive
to produce innovations unless they have a monopoly (exclusive) right to the
economic returns.”); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton & Kenneth C. Baseman, The
Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for Software: The Proper Role
for Copyright (1994), Paper prepared for June 1994 meeting of the American
Council on Interoperable Systems in Washington, D.C. (“Governmental
intervention is clearly desirable to establish property rights in information and to
prevent users from ‘free riding’ inappropriately on the efforts of its creators);
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations on the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 333 (1995) (“The fundamental
justification for creating property rights in the results of innovation is to deal
with the appropriability problem.”).
303

See J. Bradford DeLong, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Sustaining

U.S. Economic Growth, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 19, 44-45 (H. Aaron, et al.
eds., 2003), at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/dgk_brook.pdf; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1070 (1987) (noting that patent
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permitted creators under existing copyright rules are also acknowledged to
impose costs as well as inefficiencies in the form of dead weight loss.304
Copyright then becomes characterized and perceived as a balance between
benefits in the form of increased production of works and costs in the form
of restrictions to access, which make it more difficult for future authors to
create.305 Although the costs and dead weight loss that result from
copyright are generally acknowledged, views of copyright tend to be
holders may charge higher prices as monopolists than would be possible under
competitive conditions and noting that these higher prices necessarily entail
higher costs to users of patented inventions); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 518
(1990) (“economic theory supports granting authors copyright in their works.
However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope because copyright
imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of induced creative
activity”, including allowing the owner of the copyright to “charge a monopoly
price for her works, because it prohibits borrowing from existing works and
makes it more difficult for future authors to create.”).
304

In additional to behavioral distortions, this monopoly capacity also imposes

costs by creating dead weight loss. See Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Sterk, supra note 302, at 1209; William
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1702-1703 (1988).
305

See Yen, supra note 303, at 518 (noting that the optimal degree of copyright

maximizes the difference between the benefits of greater creative activity and
the costs of increased authors’ rights); CED Report, supra note 302, at 8
(“Copyright law balances protection of initial creators with the importance of
the competitive supply of follow-on innovation, and is (or should be ) cautious
about providing control to the initial innovator that would allow barring of
subsequent innovator or control over the scope and director of their
innovation.”).
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based on questionable notions about the nature of free riding. Conceptions
of copyright thus discount and even ignore borrowing at least in part as a
consequence of assumptions that are often made about free riding.
Discussions of free riding often fail to note sufficiently the fact that
copyright frameworks result in certain types of free riding being treated
differently than others,306 as well as the pervasive and inevitable nature of
free riding in cultural expression. As is evident in George Gershwin’s
compositional practice and music composition generally,307 music
production is virtually impossible without some type of free riding or
borrowing, either with respect to broader musical traditions and
conventions or existing works.
Consequently, the appropriate question as a starting point from a copyright
perspective should be transformed from one that focuses on how to limit
borrowing into an inquiry into the acceptable scope of communication,
free riding or transmission of existing knowledge. The reality of free
riding and borrowing in cultural production suggests that a transmission
based approach to copyright might be fruitful in first of all acknowledging
306

See Dale A. Nance, Foreward: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL.

757, 772 (1990) (questioning the integrity of a system of intellectual property
that protects certain types of creative effort from free riding more extensively
than others).
307

See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text; see also J. Peter Burkholder,

Borrowing, in 4 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 1-[36] (Stanley
Sadie ed. 2001) (discussing the pervasiveness of musical borrowing in all musical genres
and time periods); J. Peter Burkholder, The Uses of Existing Music: Musical Borrowing as
a Field, 50 NOTES, 851, 852 (1994) (giving an overview of musical borrowing as a field);
Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the significance of musical borrowing for
copyright frameworks).
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the essential nature of borrowing in cultural production and secondly
defining the scope of acceptable transmissions. This transmission focused
approach would be a contrast to current perspectives that treat copyright as
essentially a property right that results from and is merited as a result of an
autonomous act of creation.308
A transmission based approach highlights potential complexities of the
creation of cultural text and the extent to which the use and operation of
control and compensation rights within copyright do not adequately
contemplate such complexities. This is particularly true since the scope of
a holder’s effective control right is by no means limited to activities
related to the development of products that incorporate the underlying
knowledge resource over which the holder exercises control. This is not
to imply that the intellectual property right as tool of innovation approach
is necessarily invalid but to suggest that it offers at best an incomplete
picture of the operation and uses of intellectual property. The breadth of
control given to copyright holders is a direct result of Romantic author
conceptions and continuing inattention to the importance of borrowing and
free riding in cultural production. Further, existing structures do not
adequately contemplate that a holder may receive value from exercise of
control rights that has nothing to do with compensation or even creation.
Consequently, how holders choose to exercise control rights and enforce
such rights in the construction of intellectual property rights has
significant implications for behavior as well as the effective operation of
intellectual property rights structures such as copyright.309
308

See generally Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.

309

See Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON.

REV. 860, 860 (1990) (“. . . the main impact of a product patent is not to create a
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Compensation and Control: Disaggregating Rights Embedded in
Copyright Structures
1.

The Copyright Balance

Copyright doctrine is based on an assumed balance between promotion of
incentives to create new works with public access to copyright protected
materials.310 The balance in copyright is intended to weigh the benefits of
the incentives of copyright against the costs of copyright grants evident in
the exclusion rights given copyright holders that enable them to restrict the
creation of new works based on copyrighted works as well as the
reinterpretation of existing copyrighted works.311 The specific context of
the uses of copyright in particular contexts, however, suggests that general
costs and benefits may be evident to varying degrees in specific settings
that may or may not reflect the general assumptions typically imagined.
2.

The Advantages of Disaggregation: A Proposal for
Separating Control and Compensation of Post-Mortem
Artistic Legacies in Music

Any balancing of rights also entails determining what rights should be
encompassed within copyright frameworks. Control and compensation
are typically treated as inevitably united, but are in fact separate rights that
should at least in certain instances be disaggregated. As a result,
instructuring copyright frameworks, attention should be given to how the
monopoly but rather to affect the variety choices that rivals make. Moreover,
the particular impact on variety choices is heavily influenced by the particular
legal mechanisms that are used to enforce patent rights”).
310

See supra notes 297 to 309 and accompanying text.

311

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, ___ (2003).
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compensation and control aspects of copyright contribute to and enhance
the core goals of copyright.
Disaggregation could be structured in such a way as to maintain the right
to receive compensation while minimizing the extent of control over
future uses of copyrighted works. One core element of copyright holders’
exclusion or control rights is contained in Section 106 of the Copyright
Act, which describes the exclusive rights of copyright holders with respect
to their copyrighted protected works.312 Disaggregating compensation and
control would essentially mean reducing the exclusion rights outlined in
Section 106 of the Copyright Act with respect to future works, while
maintaining the right of copyright holders to receive compensation for
uses of existing material in such future works that might be encompassed
by the current Section 106 statutory language.
An initial step toward disaggregation would be a modification of Section
106(2) and 104(4). Section 106(2) gives copyright holders the exclusive
312

Section 106 of the Copyright Act contains provisions relating to the exclusive

rights of copyright holders. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003) (giving copyright
holders the exclusive right to (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission).
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right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, while
Section 106(4) gives copyright holders the exclusive right to perform and
display musical, dramatic and other works.
These subsections, and other provisions of the Copyright Act as might be
necessary to implement this proposed structure, should be modified such
that music copyright holders would have limited ability after the death of
the creator to restrict both derivative works and performances or displays
that seek to reinterpret the copyright protected work. Following a
creator’s death, the control rights with respect to these subsections would
then differ from compensation rights with respect to them. After a
creator’s death, uses falling within Sections 106(2) and (4) would be
permitted (“Permitted Uses”). In terms of control, certain limitations on
Permitted Uses would still need to be implemented, such that the scope of
control would permit a copyright holder to restrict use of copyrighted
material in certain specific contexts (“Unfair Uses”). Unfair Uses would
include uses in commercial advertisements, uses for purposes that might
constitute a misrepresentation and in which clear disclaimers are not used,
Permitted Uses by a single Permitted User in excess of a reasonable
amount and uses for strategic or anti-competitive actions that would be
reasonably likely to damage the market share for the original work.
Under this proposal, a copyright holder would be able to restrict Unfair
Uses but could not exercise control over Permitted Uses unless a
Permitted Use intentionally or maliciously sought to damage the market
for the original work (an “Exempted Permitted Use”), in which case the
Permitted Use would be treated in the same manner as an Unfair Use. The
copyright holder would be entitled to receive compensation for both
Permitted Uses and Unfair Uses, but would have limited control rights
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with respect to Permitted Uses. Unfair Uses would require a prior license
from the copyright holder and would thus be substantially similar to the
existing copyright property rule.
In contrast, compensation for Permitted Uses should be based on a
structure in which the person seeking to make a Permitted Use (the
“Permitted User”) would be required to pay a fee to the copyright holder
based on the proposed use. The fees for Permitted Uses (the “Permitted
Use Fees”) should be essentially a royalty based upon a fixed percentage
of the net earnings from the new work, which would mean that the
copyright holder would receive more compensation for uses that are more
successful financially. Obviously, determination of the percentage to be
charged for Permitted Use Fees (the “Permitted Use Rate”) would be a
crucial aspect of this proposal. One potential source of guidance for
Permitted Use Fees could be set threshold rate levels for Permitted Use
Rates that could be adjusted depending on popularity of Permitted Uses of
a given work.313 Although copyright holders are likely to be opposed to
any type of Permitted Uses, allowing Permitted Uses following a creator’s
death actually has the potential to increase revenues to heirs and legal
successors.314 For example, such uses can bring attention to works from
earlier eras or that might otherwise be unknown.315
313

Professor Fisher’s recently proposed rewards system that would replace

copyright includes a pricing structure based upon the popularity of later uses of
a work. See Fisher, supra note 301, at 199-258 (proposing a rewards system
that would replace current copyright frameworks).
314

See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STANFORD L. REV.

485, 515-516 (2004) (noting that the R.E.M. 1986 cover of the song Superman
brought attention to the original 1969 release by an obscure group named Clique
and resulted in the Clique song being re-issued in a compilation recording in
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Disaggregation would thus be in line with the goals and objectives of
copyright law, and reflect the fact that the substantial legally protected
interest of a creator is the creator’s interest in potential financial returns
from such creator’s works that come from public’s appreciation of the
creator’s efforts.316
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection
accorded to music has been to give the composer an adequate
return for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious
and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with
the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would
accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might

1998); Joanna Demers, Sampling the 1970s in Hip-Hop, 22 POP. MUSIC 41, 4142 (2003) (discussing sampling of 1970s funk and soul recordings and
soundtracks from Blaxploitation films by hip hop artists); Errol A. Henderson,
Black Nationalism and Rap Music, 26 J. BLACK STUDIES 308, 311-312 (1996)
(discussing Public Enemy sampling of 1970s Isaac Hayes tune and noting that
hip hop “allows for creative synthesis in the context of cross-generational
cultural transmission”).
315

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.

316

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); Sony Corporation v.

Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.”); Alan Latman,
“Probative Similarity” As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1990).
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be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the
purpose of protecting his interests.317
Disaggregation of compensation and control would move copyright in a
direction that would incorporate to a greater extent the public benefits that
are an integral part of the copyright balance:318
Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing
interest in the free flow of ideas, information and commerce on the
other hand.319

317

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 163-164 (1975)

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909)); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1909

COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski ed., 1976) (hereinafter,

“1909 House Report”).
318

See 1909 House Report, supra note 317, at 7 (noting that copyright balances

between stimulation of production and benefit to the public); Craig W. Dallon,
The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 437 (2004) (noting
that passage of CTEA suggests that Congress did not give serious attention to
public benefit rationale of copyright); Garon, supra note 13, at 521 (noting that
Congress has “focused on the economic success of the most dominant providers
of media content”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-217 (2003) (noting
that patent involves a more exacting quid pro quo for granting an intellectual
property right in exchange for the benefit derived by the public than does
copyright).
319

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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Such disaggregation would also mean that the compensation right within
copyright might not have the same scope, breadth or duration as the
control right. Given the goals of copyright, the scope of the control right
should be substantially less than the compensation right.
3.

The Practical Consequences of Disaggregation

Disaggregation makes the most sense with respect to copyright law
treatment of post-mortem artistic legacies. Consequently, existing
copyright structures that aggregate compensation and control should at
most continue to exist during the lives of creators only. This would
effectively mean limiting the control aspects of certain provisions of
existing copyright statutes to at most life. Provisions that relate to control,
including Section 106 of the Copyright Act, would thus need to be
modified under this proposal.
In the case of Porgy and Bess, disaggregating control from compensation
would mean that the Gershwin family would be entitled to receive
compensation from staged productions and derivative works of Gershwin
creations, but would not be able, for instance, to control casting or
interpretations that might update or reinterpret the work. Racial casting
could thus no longer be stipulated by the Gershwins. This proposal would
have an impact on the types of cases the Gershwins could bring and would
mean a different outcome for cases such as Gershwin Publishing
Corporation v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,320 where Gershwin
Publishing sued Columbia Artists Management (CAMI) for contributory
copyright infringement relating to performers managed by CAMI who

320

443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
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performed the piece “Bess, You Is My Woman Now” from Porgy and
Bess at a public for profit event without authorization from Gershwin
Publishing. Under the proposal described in this Article, unless the use
constitutes an Unfair Use, the Gershwins would be limited to seeking
compensation for such uses to the extent that they were not already
compensated as a Permitted Use.
Although the heirs of creators clearly have an interest in Gershwin’s
works, their interests, at least with respect to control elements, are
outweighed by the societal benefit that would result from decreasing their
control rights. This social benefit would come as a result of the increased
flow of information, ideas and commerce that were noted as an integral
part of the copyright balance by the Sony court.321
C.

Switching the Default Rule to Unfair Use: Disaggregation and
Liability Rules

Current copyright standards are essentially a property rule that assumes
that disfavors borrowing except in certain specified instances such as fair
use and de minimis uses.322 Although this property rule may effectively
operate as a statutory liability rule in certain respects,323 explicitly

321

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.

322

See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.

323

Robert P. Merges, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm: Comments: Of

Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994);
Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 705 (1996) (noting that property rules are liability rules
with a high exercise price).
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acknowledging the advantages of true liability rule structures in music
copyright would be better suited to actual musical practice:
The current copyright system is in most respects a property rule
under which nonconsensual takings are discouraged. In music
copyright, such nonconsensual takings are conceived of as
copyright infringement and are only permissible if the copyright
owner consents to such use, most often through the granting of
some type of license. Actual musical practice, however, which has
always entailed borrowing, is far better suited to a liability rule,
which would permit infringement of the legal entitlement with ex
post determination of appropriate compensation.324
A property rule potentially distorts the creation of music by virtue of the
fact that borrowing is more difficult under a property rule.325
Incorporating conceptions of unfair use into copyright doctrine would
mean moving from a standard of no borrowing except in cases such as fair
use to a standard that permits borrowing other than in cases of unfair use.
Unfair use doctrine could be developed through judicial application of
unfair use standards, incorporation of unfair use concepts in statutes and
the development of unfair use standard commercial practices.326

324

Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (citations omitted).

325

A property rule by its nature implicitly assumes that borrowing is not the

norm and should occur only with permission. In contrast, a liability rule
implicitly assumes that borrowing is the norm and makes an ex post
determination as to compensation. Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1.
326

Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright, Borrowing and Unfair Use (2006) (manuscript on

file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Unfair Use”)
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A liability rule based on unfair use could be used to refocus the nature of
copyright as a transmission right rather than ownership right with respect
to underlying knowledge.327 A transmission based approach would permit
recognition of the original contributions of the creator as well as the
collaborative and intertextual elements of the creator’s works. The
transmission right could then attach to the specific combination that
comprises the knowledge intangible underlying copyright as a whole
without reaching on an individual basis the constituent elements that
comprise that whole. A transmission based model is a good fit in the
music area where borrowing is commonplace across time and musical
genres. This would mean practically that transmissions or borrowings
would in specified cases be presumed to not constitute infringement unless
they damaged an existing work in specific identifiable ways.
In the case of Porgy and Bess, no license would be needed to stage a new
version of Porgy and Bess. The Gershwins could, however, require a
clear disclaimer that would clearly inform audiences that the production
was not authorized by the Gershwins and would be able to receive a share
of revenues from the new production. In addition, under a liability rule,
they might still be entitled to damages or be able to obtain an injunction
against Unfair Uses. The threshold for such damages should involve a
standard that requires significant material damage to the prospects of the
work, which should be distinguishable from the creator’s image or
persona.
Focusing on constitutive processes and transmissions rather than states of
being with regard to property ownership may also shed light with respect
327

Id.
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to the structure of the public domain. Current notions of the public
domain can be quite static and reflect a view of the public domain as a
place or status.328 Viewing the public domain as reflective of a process
means that what constitutes the public domain is not just a question of
whether something is or is not in the pool of public domain knowledge but
also a question about how the public domain is constituted and
reconstituted, how it interacts with “private” knowledge and how “private”
spheres of knowledge interact with one other. Moving in the direction of a
liability rule based on Unfair Use, combined with the disaggregation of
control and compensation in certain instances, will help ensure that
copyright contains rights that are consistent with its goal of compensation
to authors on account of the creation of new works, not control over all
uses of such works for a time period that far exceeds the lifetime of those
alive at the time such works were created.
Copyright owners may argue that this will reduce the value of copyrights
to holders and will make transactions more difficult to value.329 Even if
this were the case, nothing in copyright gives copyright holders the right
to extract the maximum possible value that might possibly be extracted
from a copyright. Rather copyright is a general balance between
competing interests, including the public interest that is thought to provide
a mechanism for the creation of new works in specific contexts of

328

See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP.

PROBS., 463, 467 (2003); Lemley, supra note 279, at 997-998; Chander &
Sunder, supra note 155, at 1351 (noting romanticization of the public domain).
329

See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that petitioner’s assertions in

Eldred case would throw numerous transactions into doubt potentially rendering
copyright transactions insecure and uncertain).
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creation.330 The value of copyrights under the liability rule based structure
proposed in this paper is largely a question of valuation. Copyrights could
be valued under the new system of rules. The value might be less than
that under current copyright rules, although this may be hard to predict
with certainty since uses of existing works in new works can actually spur
interest in markets for existing works. Regardless of whether such values
may be less than those that might occur under a property rule, such values
are ones that can be determined and calculated.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of combining and synthesizing elements borrowed from various
sources in the creation of his compositions, George Gershwin created
music that is heard and appreciated around the world close to 70 years
after his death. The music George Gershwin created was greatly
facilitated by his ability to borrow. Although some of his borrowings,
particularly of African American cultural elements, were enabled by a
copyright structure that mirrored existing societal hierarchies that
considered the cultural production of African Americans to be part of the
public domain. Consequently, such material was seen as readily
appropriable,331 particularly by white artists who were able to make cover

330

See Litman, supra note 284, at 967 (“The public domain should be

understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as
a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material
of authorship available for authors to use.”).
331

VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 2, at 117-148; Hall, supra note 2, at 31-51; Greene, supra

note 2, at 354-383.
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recordings and perform such works for white audiences.332 Such use of
African American cultural production in a broader societal milieu in which
African American performers were typically subject to significant
restrictions on both their ability to perform publicly for non-African
American audiences. These restrictions were reinforced by the structure
and marketing practices of the recording industry, which mean that
African American recording artists were identified by their race since most
were placed in the category of “Race” records.333 These dynamics
reflected the segregation in the broader society that was also a core part of
how the recording industry categorized and marketed music.334 In fact,
prior to [1949], the category now termed R&B or Rhythm and Blues was

332

Hall, supra note 2, at 44 (noting Little Richard’s recounting in a Home Box Office

television special that a version of his rock anthem “Tutti Frutti” that reached the number
on the pop charts in a version recorded by Pat Boone).
333

GUTHRIE P. RAMSEY, JR., RACE MUSIC 113 (University of California, 2003) (“In 1920, a

recording by blues singer Mamie Smith helped to establish the race records institution in
American popular culture.”); Hall, supra note 2, at 38 (“Under the precepts of the recording
industry’s segmented marketing systems, however, recordings of their [cornetist Louis
Armstrong and pianist Ferdinand “Jelly Roll” Morton] music were distributed on ‘race
record’ labels geared specifically to Blacks and remained invisible to most whites. By that
time music recorded by white dance bands, led by Paul Whiteman’s was being introduced
to mainstream as ‘jazz’ through record labels and performance venues specifically
marketed to them.”) (citations omitted); David Brackett, What a Difference a Name Makes:
Two Instances of African-American Popular Music, in THE CULTURAL STUDY OF MUSIC: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 238,

241 (Martin Clayton, Trevor Herbert & Richard Middleton

eds. 2003) (noting that in the 1920s the recording industry organized the popular music
fields around the divisions of “popular,” “race,” and “hillbilly”); _____________, in
RHYTHM AND BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC ___, ___ (Norman
Kelley, ed. 2005).
334

Greene, supra note 2, at 353, 362, 374-377, 384-389.
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actually called Race music that was marketed primarily for an African
American audience.335 As a result, the race of many African American
performers could be readily discerned just by virtue of how their music
was categorized. Works of white performers who made recordings of this
same music were not classified as Race music.336
This racial categorization of music had a profound influence on
borrowings from African American cultural production and the
compensation and recognition given for such borrowings. An Unfair Use
standard is intended to address instances where borrowings become
inequitable on account of the nature of the borrowings, the broader
societal context within which such borrowings occur or other factors. At
the same time, this standard gives proper recognition to the importance of
borrowing in the creation of music. Under an Unfair Use standard, to the
extent that Gershwin’s borrowings constituted unfair use, they could be
enjoined or Gershwin might be required to pay compensation or give
acknowledgment as to the sources of his material or both.
Borrowing was an inherent part of Gershwin’s music composition process.
The control now exerted by copyright holders in the musical arena today
has the potential to prevent the types of borrowing that helped make
George Gershwin’s music so memorable and loved:

335

Brackett, supra note 333, at 242 (“The years around 1947 prove instructive: while the

music industry was in the process of slowing recognizing the importance of black popular
music, it effectively excluded the representation of black music from the mainstream.”).
336

PAUL OLIVER, SONGSTERS AND SAINTS: VOCAL TRADITIONS ON RACE RECORDS ____

(Cambridge 1984) (noting that Race records were marketed primarily for a black audience).
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Marc G. Gershwin, a nephew of George and Ira Gershwin and a co-trustee
of the Gershwin Family Trust, said: “The monetary part is important, but
if works of art are in the public domain, you can take them and do
whatever you want with them. For instance, we've always licensed 'Porgy
and Bess' for stage performance only with a black cast and chorus. That
could be debased. Or someone could turn 'Porgy and Bess' into rap
music.” Indeed, that is just the issue, say critics of copyright extension
who argue that constant renewals of the copyright law stifle artistic
innovation, the creation of new works based on the old.337 The view of
creation expressed by Marc Gershwin would mean that the types of
creation in which George Gershwin engaged would likely be disallowed
since his musical practice involved meshing elements from disparate
traditions.338
By focusing on ensuring compensation and minimizing control with
respect to cultural texts, a transmission based liability rule approach to
copyright frameworks can help ameliorate both the borrowing from
sources that are for reasons of cultural hierarchies considered to be part of
the public domain as well as control over copyrighted works that might
hinder the creation of new works based on such preexisting works. A
transmission based approach with a liability rule would require
compensation with respect to such borrowings, but would seek to
minimize impediments to and control of borrowings that might serve as
337

Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse

Joins the Fray, NY TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7.
338

Garon, supra note 13, at 595 (responding to the Marc Gershwin quotation

and noting that given that “[t]he work of the Gershwin brothers drew on
African-American musical traditions. What could be more appropriate?”).
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the basis for the creation of future works. As such, a transmission based
approach with a liability rule has the potential to both stimulate the
production of new and vibrant works as well as meet the goals of
copyright of providing compensation to creators that may incentivize
creation.
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